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ABSTRACT 
In 1914, Newfoundland was a self-governing dominion 
of the British Empire. With the declaration of war, 
Newfoundland agreed to send five hundred men to serve in the 
British Army. Very quickly this nucleus of five hundred grew 
to form the Newfoundland Regiment. 
The Newfoundlanders fought as an infantry regiment of the 
British Army. National identity, however, was maintained 
through the institution of the regiment. The traditional 
British regiment functioned as a soldier's home and in this 
capacity of social organisation, it was significant in 
promoting troop morale and unit cohesion. 
The regiment, and its influence upon morale and cohesion 
is the focus of this thesis. Throughout the war, the regiment 
was manned by Newfoundlanders and it maintained a distinctive 
identity as was encouraged by the traditional regimental 
system. The support from home bolstered this distinctiveness 
with care packages which maintained the links with 
Newfoundland. 
This thesis examines the experience of Newfoundland's 
soldiers through the framework of the regiment. The importance 
of the "national" regiment and the support from the people in 
Newfoundland demonstrate the essential link between the 
soldier and the society from which he comes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of the Newfoundland Regiment1 in 
the First World War. It is an investigation of ~orale in a 
specific infantry battalion of the British Army. 2 The object 
of this thesis is to demonstrate that together, community 
support and the institution of the regiment were influential 
and essential in creating, promoting and maintaining morale. 
This will explain why the Newfoundland Regiment had 
significantly better morale than their counterparts in the 
rest of the British infantry. 
It will be argued that the Newfoundland Regiment 
functioned, in terms of the regimental system, as a 
traditional infantry battalion when other battalions could 
not. They demonstrated an example of how the regimental system 
should work when all around them the system was collapsing. 
First, the relationship between morale, cohesion and the 
regimental system will be demonstrated. Then the 
Newfoundlanders' experience, given their particularly strong 
community ties, will be shown to be significantly different 
1The title "Newfoundland Regiment" will be used throughout the 
thesis to avoid confusion and temporal qualification. In World War 
One, the title "Royal" was awarded in 1917. 
2A typical regiment had two battalions of 1000 men each. The 
Newfoundland Regiment had only one battalion. The regimental system 
is discussed in greater detail in chapter two. 
2 
than that of the rest of the British Army. 
The novelty of this study is in the approach and the 
source materials. There has been little scholarly research on 
this particular regiment in the First World War. There 
certainly has not been a study of the Newfoundland Regiment's 
morale. Significantly, the regiment ha~ not been studied using 
the "experience of war" approach. 3 Unfortunately, there has 
been little use made of the invaluable primary sources of 
letters, diaries and interviews. This is the first attempt at 
a social history of the Newfoundland Regiment. 
In the broadest sense, this is a case study in troop 
morale. Necessarily, there is an amount of comparison 
involved. For the most part, comparisons are limited to other 
battalions of the British infantry. This is because the 
Newfoundlanders fought as a unit of the British infantry, 
within the British command structure. Direct comparisons with 
other Dominion forces such the Canadians or the Australians 
and New Zealanders would be of limited use. The Dominion 
armies used a different system of troop organization which was 
not strictly analogous to the British regimental system. The 
scope of the thesis is limited to the British infantry in the 
3Also known as the "Face of Battle" approach after J.Keegan 
The Face of Battle (London:Pimlico;1976) See also P.Simpkins 
"Everyman at War: Recent Interpretations of the Front Line 
Experience" in B . Bond ( ed. ) -=T~h~e=--~F~l=· =r-=s::....:t=----=W~o=r-=1=-==d~--=w~a=r_..!;::a~n..!..:d~_B=r~i::....:t::..;l=. . .::::s~h 
Military History (Oxford: O.U.P. 1991) 
3 
First World War and Newfoundland's role in it. 
The first two chapters lay the theoretical ground work . 
Cohesion and morale are discussed and defined in the first 
chapter and a working definition is proposed which suggests 
three essential elements of morale. The idea of the regiment 
and the significance of the regimental system are discussed in 
the second. The way in which the regiment fosters the 
essential elements of morale and cohesion is discussed in this 
chapter. The following chapter moves from the theoretical to 
the practical and outlines the effects of battlefield 
attrition upon the regimental system. This section focuses 
upon the way in which changes in the regiment were detrimental 
to the promotion of morale. National identity and the 
Newfoundlander's corporate identity is the focus of the next 
chapter. It will be demonstrated that this strong 
identification with the community was essential in maintaining 
morale and promoting a commonality of purpose. The final 
chapter details the morale building efforts specific to the 
Newfoundlanders. The way morale was created, promoted and 
maintained in the Newfoundland Regiment will be investigated 
using, as far as is possible, first hand accounts. Morale can 
then be explained using the dynamic of the British regimental 
system. 
It has been suggested that military history is "history 
by virtue of its subject matter, not by virtue of a particular 
4 
methodology. 114 By virtue of its subject matter, this is a 
study in military history. The military, however, does not 
exist in isolation. The respected historian, Sir Michael 
Howard, advises that: 
Military history - by which I mean the history of 
armed forces and their conduct in war can no more 
be separated from general history than can the activity 
of war itself, from the societies that engage in it. 5 
For this reason, the present study is necessarily a work of 
Newfoundland history. Elsewhere, Howard writes that military 
operations are "powerfully affected by social and economic 
considerations" that influence variables such as equipment , 
training, leadership and troop morale. 6 To learn about the 
Newfoundland Regiment when it fought in Europe, it is 
necessary to examine the society from which the regiment came. 
By subject, this thesis is both military history and 
Newfoundland history. By methodology, it is one aspect of the 
social history of war. 
The secondary sources consulted in this thesis can 
4T.Travers and c. Archer Men at War: Politics, Technology and 
Innovation in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Precedent; 1982) p.1. 
5M.Howard "The Crisis in European History: The Role of the 
Military Historian" in The Journal of Military History 57:5;127. 
6M.Howard, The Lessons of History (New Haven: Yale University 
Press; 1991) p.41. 
5 
generally be described as "war and society" literature. 7 They 
serve two functions. The first is to provide a synthesis for 
the theoretical discussions of morale, cohesion and the 
regimental system. The second is to provide context and some 
limited comparisons for the discussions of the army and 
British society during the First World War. 
The first chapter examines the standard British 
works on morale and relies chiefly on the American school of 
military sociology for discussions of cohesion. 8 The chapter 
on the regimental system draws upon the excellent social and 
political histories of the British Army before and during the 
war. Notably, these include Spiers, The Army and Society ~8~5-
~914 and Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition ~558-~945. 9 
The better treatments of the British Army discuss the 
importance of the regiment so a number of the broader studies 
of Britain in the First World War are also brought into this 
synthesis. 
The published sources provide the necessary context into 
7see: Bond, The First World War and British Military History, 
D.Charters et. al. Military History and the Military 
Profession (London: Praeger; 1992) and M.Howard, The Lessons of 
History (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1991) 
8A full discussion of this literature is found in the chapter. 
9E.Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London: Longman; 
1980) I.Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press: 1991) and I.Beckett and 
J.Gooch Politicians and Defence 1845-1970 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press; 1981). 
6 
which the study of morale and the Newfoundland Regiment may be 
placed. The discussion of attrition, manpower policy and the 
disintegration of the regiment is based on the recent studies 
of Britain in the First World War. Keith Simpson's Kitchener•s 
Army, Beckett and Simpson's A Nation in Arms and Denis 
Winter's Death's Men all examine the army in the context of 
British society . 10 These are concerned with political and 
economic questions as well as issues of recruitment, supply, 
officer-man relations, morale and the soldier's experience. 
Unfortunately, literature on Newfoundland in the First 
World War is limited. General histories mention the subject in 
passing or ignore it completely. 11 The first specific history 
was Nicholson's The Fighting Newfoundlander, published in 
1964. 12 It was written as the official regimental history and 
it is still the standard reference work on the regiment in the 
First World War. A very good battle history of the 
Newfoundlanders at Beaumont-Hamel is Cave's What Became of 
10I.Beckett and K.Simpson A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of 
the British Army in the First World War (Manchester: Manc~ester 
University Press;1985) K.Simpson, Kitcheners Army: The Raising of 
the New Armies 1914-16 (Manchester: Manchester University Press; 
1988) D.Winter Death's Men (London: Penguin; 1979) 
11s.J.R. Noel Politics in Newfoundland (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press: 1973) and F.Rowe History of Newfoundland and 
Labrador (Toronto:McGraw-Hill; 1980) 
12G.W.L. Nicholson The Fighting Newfoundlander (St.John's: The 
Government of Newfoundland; 1964) 
7 
Corporal Pittman? 13 • The administration of Newfoundland's 
war effort is the subject of O'Brien's master's thesis 
entitled "The Newfoundland Patriotic Association and the 
Administration of the War Effort: 1914-18 11 • 14 This excellent 
socio-political study examines the war in Newfoundland but 
does not extend to the Regiment overseas. The most recent 
scholarly treatment of Newfoundland in the First World War is 
Sharpe's article "The Race of Honour: An Analysis of 
Enlistments and Casualties in the Armed Forces of Newfoundland 
1914-18". 15 This is a demographic survey in which comparisons 
are made to the larger context of the British and Canadian 
experiences. Unfortunately, this is the extent of the 
scholarship on Newfoundland in the First World War. 
There is nothing written specifically on the concept of 
the regiment in the Newfoundland case. Within the broader 
aspects Newfoundland history, there exists the opinion that an 
infantry regiment was not the best way for the colony to 
contribute to the war effort. This position originated with a 
statement made by the leader of the Union Party, William 
13J.B. Cave What Became of Corporal Pittman? (St.John's: 
Breakwater; 1976) 
14P. R. 0' Brien "The Newfoundland Patriotic Association: The 
Administration of the War Effort 1914-18" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 
Memorial University of Newfoundland: 1982) 
15c. Sharpe "The Race of Honour: An Analysis of Enlistments and 
Casualties in the Armed Forces of Newfoundland 1914-18." 
Newfoundland Studies 4:1;27-55. (1988) 
8 
Coaker, who sat on the opposition side of the House of 
Assembly. Coaker "opposed the formation of an independent land 
force as extravagant and wasteful." 16 He suggested that 
expanding the Royal Naval Reserve would better serve 
Newfoundland's situation since "most of the cost would be 
borne by the imperial government. " 1 7 The disastrous cost, 
both in men and money, is at the heart of other criticisms of 
Newfoundland's military contribution. 18 Clearly there is 
another side to this argument. 
There is a great void in our knowledge and understanding 
of this aspect of Newfoundland's history. Conversely, there is 
a rather smaller, but significant gap in the history of the 
First World War. Because so little work has been done in this 
field, there exist many opportunities for a variety of 
enquiries. The present study uses morale as a window through 
which the experience of Newfoundland's soldiers may be 
examined. It will contribute to the writing on morale and the 
regimental system and will fill a long neglected gap in 
16I.MacDonald, To Each His Own: William Coaker and the 
Fishermen's Protective Union in Newfoundland Politics 1908-25 
J.K.Hiller (ed.) (St.John's: Institute of Social and Economic 
Research; 1987) p.48. Coaker's statement appeared in the union 
organ, The Weekly Mail and Advocate, September 29, 1914. 
17MacDonald, William Coaker and the Fisherman's Protective 
Union p.48. 
18see: Sharpe, "The Race of Honour" p.25. Noel, Politics in 
Newfoundland (Chapter 6: Politicians and the War) and O'Brien, "The 
Newfoundland Patriotic Association" passim. 
9 
Newfoundland history. 
CHAPTER ONE 
MORALE AND COHESION 
The morale of a soldier is the 
single greatest factor in war 
Montgomery of Alamein1 
It has been suggested that morale and cohesion are really 
the same thing, the difference being that the British insist 
on the word morale and the American writers prefer cohesion. 
This is a false assumption as the two terms, though closely 
related, are manifestly different. This distinction is 
especially important with regards to this study of the men of 
the Newfoundland Regiment. As a point of entry, it is 
sufficient to say that morale and cohesion are two separate 
but related ideas. This will become clear as it is 
demonstrated how, given the right circumstances, cohesion 
facilitates and builds morale. 
Morale is the rather vague word used to describe the 
"spirit" or "mood" of an individual or group. It is a very 
important concept in writing about the military as it is 
widely accepted that to have high morale is good and to have 
low morale is bad. While there has been some considerable 
writing regarding the subject, there is little agreement on 
1B.L.Montgomery The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery 
(London: Fontana; 1960) p.83. 
11 
what constitutes morale, and even less consensus as to a 
concise definition of the word. 2 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary provides the following 
definition of morale: " Morale: noun. Morale condition, 
especially (of troops) as regards discipline and 
confidence. " 3 Regrettably, the font of all lexicographical 
knowledge is not of much help in this case. The literature on 
morale will be reviewed and from this, I will propose a 
working definition specific to the present study of the 
Newfoundland Regiment. 
A good place to begin is the respected Morale: A Study of 
Men and Courage by Baynes. He states that "High morale is the 
most important quality of a soldier. It is a quality of mind 
and spirit which combines courage, self discipline and 
endurance. 114 He describes it as "the way in which people 
react to the conditions of their existence." 5 In an analysis 
2see: Lord Moran, Anatomy of Courage (London:Constable;1945) 
John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (London: Cassell; 
1967). F.M.Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological 
Factors in War (London: Leo Cooper; 1978) Brent Wilson, 'Morale 
and Discipline in the B.E.F. 1914-18' Unpublished M.A. Thesis 
(Un i versity of New Brunswick 1978) and John Fuller Troop Morale and 
Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918. 
(Oxford: Clarendon; 1990) 
3 The Concise Oxford Dictionary Third Edition.(Oxford : 
Clarendon; 1938). 
4J.Baynes Morale p.108. 
5J.Baynes Morale p.92. 
12 
from a medical and psychiatric perspective, Major-General 
F.M.Richardson suggests that group morale is comprised of 
three factors. They are: first, the membership of a contented 
unit with confidence in its leaders; second, confidence and 
respect for comrades; third, determination not to let down 
friends or the unit. 6 
An oft quoted but less satisfying definition of morale 
comes from S.L.A. Marshall's Men Against Fire. "· .. morale is 
the thinking of an army. It is the whole complex body of an 
army's thought: the way it feels about the soil and about the 
people from which it springs. " 7 This definition is too 
general and while it is true that the factors that influence 
morale indeed arise from the "the soil and about the people 
from which it springs", it says nothing about what makes good 
morale, what destroys it and the indicators of high or low 
morale. 
The 1922 Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry 
into Shell Shock described morale as "confidence in one's self 
and one's comrades ... confidence of the spirit .... " 8 It 
was observed that during the war, "the incidence of Shell 
6F.M.Richardson Fighting Spirit p.172. 
7 s.L.A.Marshall Men Against Fire (New York:Morrow;1947) p.158. 
8war Office (United Kingdom), Reoort of the War 
Committee of Enauirv into Shell Shock [Command Paper 
(London: H.M.S.O.; 1922) p.208. 
Office 
1734]. 
13 
Shock varied inversely with the morale of the troops." 9 With 
this recognition of the significance of high morale came 
recommendations on how to encourage it. In promoting and 
maintaining morale "good food, good housing, recreational 
relaxation and attention to the comfort and well being of the 
soldier are of the greatest service. 1110 
Field Marshal Montgomery knew the value of high morale 
and determined that it was composed of four essential 
elements. These are: discipline, self respect, leadership and 
comradeship. 11 While it useful to know the stuff of which 
morale is made, it does not offer a definition of the term. 
It is agreed that morale is a noun but it is an abstract 
noun not unlike the words love , confidence or security. They 
are, like morale, states of being. But so far the literature 
presents a number of synonyms or impossibly large definitions. 
Morale is confidence. Morale is the thinking of an army. It is 
a spirit of discipline and endurance. It is devotion to a 
group. All these elements, either singly or in combination , 
may be attributes of high morale but they do not provide us 
with an exact definition. 
9 Report on Shell Shock (1922) p.150. 
10Report on Shell Shock (1922) p.149 . 
11Field-Marshal B.L.Montgomery "Morale in Battle" British 
Medical Journal (Nov. 9,1946) p.702. Also: Montgomery, A History of 
Warfare (London:Collins:1968) p.17. And quoted in Brent Wilson 
"Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.2. 
14 
Baynes wrote that morale was "the way in which people 
react to the conditions of their existence." I would expand 
this to say that morale is a mood or disposition displayed by 
an individual or by a group which reflects an attitude towards 
their situation. Montgomery describes the effect of this 
disposition as being that which "makes men endure and show 
courage in times of fatigue and danger." 12 In military terms, 
high morale refers to the positive attitude, which, indeed, 
may be described as confidence. "Confidence" might describe 
the state of morale but the term should not be confused as 
being synonymous with it. Having offered one definition for 
morale, it would be useful to examine the components of morale 
and the ways in which it may be promoted and maintained. 
One of the most significant conclusions of the 1922 
Report on Shell Shock was the advice: "Morale can be, and has 
to be, created. 1113 It had been previously assumed that the 
British soldier was just naturally brave. Morale, it was 
thought, was something that occurred rather than something 
that was created. 14 This line of thought changed during the 
First World War. 
Frederick J. Manning makes a critical distinction between 
12Montgomery, "Morale in Battle" p.704. 
13Report on Shell Shock (1922) p.208. 
14Anthony Kellett Combat Motivation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff; 
1982) p.17. 
15 
morale and the separate ideas of cohesion and esprit. He 
claims that cohesion and esprit are used incorrectly as 
synonyms of morale but are, in fact, separate components of 
good morale. Cohesion, according to Manning, is "the bonding 
together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their 
will." 15 Esprit, he claims, is a parallel concept to 
cohesion but at a higher (secondary) level, it is "pride and 
devotion to a formal group" and can be seen in the soldier's 
self esteem as it relates to the reputation of the unit. 16 
It can be said, therefore, that cohesion and esprit are the 
building blocks of morale. Both these terms will be discussed 
in greater detail but this review concerns the literature 
dealing with morale. 
Earlier, morale was defined as a mood or disposition 
displayed by an individual or group which reflects an attitude 
toward their situation. The task remains to investigate the 
characteristics of morale and what indicators may be used to 
determine the morale of troops. 
Baynes' study of one battalion of the Cameronians in 
World War I is one of the best known and perhaps most 
15Frederick J. Manning, "Morale Cohesion and Esprit de Corps" 
in R.Gal and D.Manglesdorff (eds.) Handbook of Military Psychology 
(Chichester: John Wiley; 1991) p.457. 
16Manning, "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps" p.458. 
16 
influential on the subject of morale. 17 He identified five 
factors as the "main ingredients" of high morale. Of greatest 
importance, he thought, was regimental loyalty: 
the pride in belonging to a good battalion, in 
knowing other people well and being known by themi 
in having strong roots in a well loved community. 8 
Regimental spirit, as will be demonstrated, was perhaps the 
single greatest characteristic of the Newfoundland Regiment in 
the First World War. Second on the list was good officer-man 
relations characterized by mutual trust and confidence. Third 
was strong discipline. Fourth was a strong sense of duty 
"developed ... by the realization that someone else would have 
to do his job if he failed." The final element, and certainly 
a necessary one, was "sound administration" which made sure 
that the men of the battalion had what they needed such as 
food and ammunition. 19 Baynes was, of course, 
describing the ideal situation. The "mood or disposition" 
would indeed be positive if the soldier was well provided for, 
could rely on his mates, had confidence in his superiors and 
was proud to belong to a team. The combination of these 
elements should have produced high morale. With these 
17J.Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage {The Second 
Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle) . 
18Baynes Morale p.253. 
19Baynes Morale pp.253-254. 
17 
conditions met, it is entirely plausible that the troops with 
high morale were able to put up with more hardship than those 
with low morale and were less prone to break psychologically 
under pressure. 20 This is borne out by the War Off ice's 
inquiry into shell shock. It reported that "The incidence of 
shell shock varied inversely with the morale of the 
troops." 21 It warned ominously: "to neglect morale in any of 
its aspects is to invite large and unnecessary casualties in 
battle and in times of stress. 1122 Clearly, there were 
consequences of having poor morale. 23 
In "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F. 1914-18", Wilson 
investigates the yardsticks by which the General Headquarters 
(G.H.Q.) Staff tried to measure morale. He evaluated the 
effectiveness of three statistical indices. They were figures 
regarding trench foot, shell shock and courts-martial. The 
evaluation of morale was difficult as these statistical guides 
were unreliable. He concluded that "Classification of trench 
foot and shell shock was confusing and the meaning of the 
20see; Moran, Anatomy of Courage pp.X , 36, and 181.: Baynes 
Morale p.93.: J.Fuller Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.30-31. 
and T.Copp and W.MacAndrew Battle Exhaustion (Montreal: MeGill-
Queen's University Press; 1991.) p.100. 
21Report on Shell Shock p.150. 
22Report on Shell Shock p.156. 
23copp and MacAndrew Battle Exhaustion p. 82. "Battle 
Exhaustion rates were directly affected by the state of the unit's 
morale, leadership, competence and esprit." 
18 
statistics was obscure. 1124 Courts-martial figures were more 
reliable, according to Wilson, but their utility was 
limited. 25 If the indices used during the war were flawed , 
what can be used as a reliable indicator for morale? 
Ahrenfeldt states "deserters and absenteeism could be 
regarded very largely as an index of morale. 1126 Desertion is 
explained in this context as the result of a lack of "morale-
building factors" such as the self-confidence accrued from 
good training and the identification with a given group. 27 
Other causes of desertion were external strains such as battle 
stress and individual emotional trauma such as changes to or 
separation from the group, death of a comrade or officer, 
personal guilt or injury and domestic stress. 28 T h i s 
reinforces the caveat made by the War Office Report on Shell 
Shock in 1922 that "to neglect morale ... is to invite large 
and unnecessary casualties .... " 
Similarly, indiscipline is described in terms of a 
symptom of poor morale. S.L.A.Marshall maintained that good 
morale did not come from harsh discipline; rather, good 
24wilson "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.311. 
25Wilson "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.311. 
26Robert Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the 
Second World War (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1958) p.204. 
27Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army p.204. 
28Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army p.204. 
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discipline was a product of high morale. 29 John Fuller 
concurs with this assessment and suggests that good discipline 
in a volunteer army was seen to be obedience by consent. 30 
A breakdown in discipline is seen as lack of self-respect, and 
disregard for the group and its leaders. 31 A withdrawal of 
the consent to obey would signify an individual at variance 
with his group. Lord Moran explained the difference between 
morale and discipline as being the difference between the 
authority coming from within and without. 32 Discipline is the 
enforced obedience to an external authority and is less 
effective than the obedience by consent. It is presumed that 
the man displaying high morale will be prevented from acts of 
indiscipline because of his respect for his leader, fear of 
disapprobation of his peers, and his desire to uphold the good 
name of the unit. 33 Not surprisingly, for something as 
nebulous as the concept of morale, there are few definite 
indicators to point to the absence or presence of morale. 
Baynes suggests that the size of the sick parade on any given 
day is a good assessment of morale. If many men present 
29s.L.A.Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: Morrow; 1947) 
Pe158. 
30J.Fuller Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.52. 
31wilson "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.3. 
32Moran The Anatomy of Courage p.173. 
33saynes Morale p.95. 
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themselves as being sick, then the morale of the unit is in 
trouble. Baynes claims that the men with high morale will 
always want to stay with the unit and will fall out only when 
seriously ill. 34 This assertion can be supported by isolated 
first hand accounts but without regular regimental statistics 
or Medical Officer's records, the size of the sick parade is 
not a reliable indicator. 35 Trench foot was thought to be 
indicative of malingering and therefore a sign of low morale. 
Later research has shown that this affliction was much less of 
a "self-inflicted-wound" than it was a genuine, unavoidable 
casualty. So the incidence of trench foot is not a good 
indicator of poor morale. 36 
As has been shown, there exists a relationship between 
morale and the incidence of psychiatric casual ties. 37 The 
statistics collected during the First World War for such 
casualties are unreliable because of the confusion over shell 
shock, the way it was diagnosed and the way it was 
recorded. 38 While the statistics used by the G.H.Q. were 
34Baynes Morale p.96. 
35see: John Gallishaw Trenching in Gallipoli (New York: 
Century; 1916) "I was almost crying at the thought of leaving ... " 
p.190. A notable exception is J.C.Dunn The War The Infantry Knew 
2nd ed. (London: Cardinal; 1987) -Memoirs of a Regimental M.O. 
36wilson "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.254. 
37Report on Shell Shock p.150. 
38wilson "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.254. 
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unreliable, the incidence of shell shock and any of the names 
it went under (such as Not Yet Diagnosed - Nervous) may be 
useful as an indicator of morale. The incidence of Shell Shock 
should not be used as a measure of morale but it has utility 
as a symptom of weakening morale. 
Discipline, or indiscipline, as reflected by criminal 
convictions can also be an indicator of morale. Wilson warns 
that data on crime rates are useful only at the local level 
and even then, are ambiguous at best. 39 The reporting and 
recording of crime is another big variable as is the type of 
crime which is reported. Discretion on the part of the 
regimental officer either in reporting the crime, or in 
sentencing the crime has much to do with the uncertainty built 
into regimental crime statistics. Again, these figures may 
indicate either the absence or presence of morale, but they 
cannot be used in any empirical survey due to the variance of 
the data. 
A number of sources agree that the root of high morale 
lies in the physical well being of the soldier. "The standard 
causes of good morale are good food, adequate rest, mail , 
proper medical care, efficient equipment and good welfare 
services." 40 In a list of the determinants of morale, Manning 
39wilson "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.312. 
40Baynes Morale p.lOl. 
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includes "Health, good food, adequate rest, clean, dry 
clothes, washing facilities and protection from the cold." 41 
It is evident that the fulfilment of basic needs such as food 
and rest, form the foundation for a unit's morale. It was 
Baynes who insisted that the sound administration of a 
battalion is essential to morale. In the final analysis, it is 
the creature comforts which are important in trying to build 
the confident and positive outlook that characterizes good 
morale. I suspect that soldiers were content when they were 
given a reason to be content: dry feet and a hot meal went a 
long way to promote and maintain morale. 
Baynes' list of the five essential ingredients for 
morale is an accurate catalogue of the characteristics of 
that which is the "single greatest factor in war". The 
battalion was shown to be important for the pride in belonging 
and the "home" it afforded the soldier. This particular aspect 
will be addressed in greater detail in the following 
discussion regarding cohesion. Healthy officer-man 
relationships were necessary for the promotion of mutual trust 
and confidence in the officer's ability to lead, and the men's 
ability to discharge their duty. Discipline was demonstrated 
to be a fair indicator as to the absence or presence of 
morale. The men's sense of duty reflected their self-respect 
41F.J. Manning "Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps" p.459. 
and Richardson Fighting Spirit p.171. 
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and the pride they had for their unit . Finally, sound 
administration was demonstrated to be essential to the 
maintenance of morale. It is an element that is not noticed 
when it works, but it is sorely missed when it is absent. Thus 
characterized, the determinants, and then also the indicators 
of morale can be identified and qualified within the context 
of a battalion in combat. The present study concerns itself 
with the morale of the officers and men of the Newfoundland 
Regiment in the context of the British Army in the First World 
War. 
* * * * 
While cohesion is not simply another word for morale, the 
two are closely related concepts. Very simply, cohesion can be 
seen to be the "mechanical" or management feature of a social 
group. It is descriptive of how well something operates. The 
cliched analogy of the well-oiled machine best illustrates 
this point. If the group is an electric motor, then morale may 
be compared to the electricity which provides power for 
movement. Cohesion may then be compared to the smooth and 
efficient action of the gears which facilitates effective 
movement. Morale may be what makes a battalion tick, but 
cohesion is the machinery that permits morale to work upon the 
battalion. 
The dictionary defines cohesion as "the tendency to stay 
united" and this is perhaps as good an explanation as any, of 
24 
what cohesion is. 42 Manning provides a more detailed 
definition: 
... the bonding together of soldiers in such a 
way as to sustain their will and commitment to 
each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment 
despite combat or mission stress. 43 
In another article, Manning and Ingraham state that "Cohesion 
represents feelings of belonging, of solidarity with a 
specifiable set of others who constitute 'we' as opposed to 
'them'."44 Cohesion is much easier to define and perhaps for 
this reason, easier to understand than morale. Cohesion 
describes the relationship between the members of the group. 
It is the solidarity, unity or sense of belonging found in 
groups which operate effectively. 
Ingraham and Manning suggest that cohesion is an idea 
which comes from social psychology and that the concept of 
morale can be traced to sociology and military history. 45 
The claim is that studies of morale differ from studies of 
cohesion in their scope of inquiry and the perspective of 
42The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Third Ed.) (Oxford: 
Clarendon: 1938) 
43F.J.Manning "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps". p.457. 
44L.H.Ingraham, and F.J.Manning "Cohesion: Who Needs it, What 
is it and How do we get it to Them?" in Military Review (1981) 
61:6:6. 
45L.H.Ingraham, and F.J.Manning "Cohesion: Who Needs it, What 
is it and How do we get it to Them?" p.6. 
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investigation. The important works on the subject of cohesion 
are sociological and psychological studies, sponsored by the 
military, produced by American scholars, and using largely 
the American Army as their focus. 
There are four seminal works on cohesion which directly 
impact upon this study of the Newfoundland Regiment overseas. 
Each new perspective seems to inspired by the experience of 
America's involvement in a war. World War II, the Korean 
Conflict and the Vietnam War were each the subject of new and 
influential studies on the social organization of soldiers. 
The first to be published was "Cohesion and Disintegration in 
the Wehrmacht in World War II" by Shils and Janowitz in 
1948. 46 This work used interviews with German prisoners of 
war to determine why the Wehrmacht was able to keep fighting 
so doggedly at the close of the Second World War. They 
concluded that "the motivation of the determined resistance of 
the German soldier was the steady satisfaction afforded by the 
social organization of the army." 47 Which is to say, as long 
as the soldier felt he belonged to the primary group, he would 
continue to offer resistance. It is significant that the 
concept of the primary group is introduced in this article. 
46J.Shils and M.Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
Wehrmacht in World War II" in Public Opinion Quarterly (1948) 
12:1:281-315. 
47Shils and Janowitz "Cohesion and Disintegration" p.281. 
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In the following year, The American Soldier was published 
under the editorship of Stouffer. 48 While Stouffer • s focus 
was more on why men fight rather than how, the sociological 
data in these volumes are enormous. For example, Stouffer 
makes the perfectly reasonable claim that men will fight for 
their buddies but not for their country or other "patriotic" 
ideals. 49 Of significance to the present study, The American 
Soldier demonstrated how important the group was to the 
soldier and that the soldier's identification and solidarity 
with the group was crucial. 50 It was a landmark work in the 
study of the soldier in his society and one which, for the 
purposes of this paper, demonstrates the existence and 
importance of the primary group. 
The next development in the study of unit cohesion came 
with Roger Little's "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance" 
in 1955. 51 This was a study based on interviews with the men 
of a rifle unit in combat in Korea. Little's contribution to 
the debate was the suggestion that the meaningful bond of 
48samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier Combat and its 
Aftermath (Vol.II.) (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press; 1949). 
49stouffer The American Soldier (Vol.I.) p.418. 
50stouffer, The American Soldier Especially Chapter 5, p.105. 
51Roger Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance" in 
Morris Janowitz (ed) The New Militarv: Chanoino Patterns of 
Organization (New York: Norton; 1969) pp.195-224. 
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solidarity was made, not to the group, but to another 
individual: a buddy. 52 He did not refute the idea of group 
solidarity but suggested that group and buddy loyalty were 
compatible and not mutually exclusive. The more significant of 
the attachments, according to Little, was to the infantryman's 
buddy. 53 This conclusion began the debate as to which bonds 
of solidarity were the more important and the question then as 
to how big could the "small group" become before it was too 
large to foster loyalty and interpersonal bonds. 
The next contribution on this subject came from a study 
of infantrymen in Vietnam entitled "Cohesion and 
Disintegration in the American Army". 54 Savage and Gabriel 
attempted to demonstrate that the American military in Vietnam 
was suffering from disintegration and that the culprit was the 
destruction of primary group cohesion by a rotation system. 55 
The dangers of rotation within the unit, instead of rotation 
of the unit as a whole, were indicated in Shils and Janowitz. 
The significance of this study is the way in which it focused 
attention back upon the primary group by examining the 
52Little "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance" p.l95. 
53Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance" p.207. 
54A.Savage and W.Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
American Army" Armed Forces and Society (1976) 2:3:340-376. 
55savage and Gabriel "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
American Army" p.341. 
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indicators of disintegration. It reinforces the idea that good 
cohesion is a function of internal military factors. It 
concluded that _the American military's problems originated 
from within its own structure. The problems were largely 
organizational and managerial. This would suggest that, like 
morale, cohesion can be created. 
Before describing the characteristic elements of the 
cohesive group, it would be instructive to discuss the 
sociological theories upon which the idea of cohesion is 
built. The literature regarding motivation and morale in 
armies focuses upon "the primary group". C.H.Cooley described 
the primary group as being "those individuals who share face 
to face association, mutual identification and co-operative 
activity aimed at common goals." 56 The socialization of men 
in a co-operative and often inter-dependant group is not only 
desirable, but essential. 
There is some discussion as to what size of group 
constitutes a primary group. As previously stated, Little 
proposed that the strongest bonds came, not from the group , 
but between two individuals. 57 savage and Gabriel's study 
56c.H.Cooley Social Organization (New York: Scribner; 1909) 
p. 23. and quoted in Shils and Janowitz "Cohesion and Disintegration 
in the Wehrmacht in World War Two" p.283. and Bartone & Kirland 
"Optimal Leadership in Small Army Units" in Handbook of Military 
Psychology p.394. 
57R.Little "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance" p.200. 
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of infantrymen in Vietnam reinforced the emphasis on the group 
as the focus of a soldier's loyalty and source of support. 58 
The literature on the First World War, while not necessarily 
sociological, agrees that membership in the small group was a 
very important element in the soldier's experience of 
war. It remains, however, to determine which unit of 
organization, (platoon, company, battalion etc.) would fit the 
description of the "primary group" in the context of the 
British Army in the First World War. In his detailed study of 
the soldier's experience of 1914-18, Winter states: "Arguably 
the small group was the strongest single sustaining force in 
the war. 1159 The group afforded the individual a sense of 
belonging and identity. The membership within the group, 
combined with the traditions of the military, provided the 
positive bonding which held soldiers together. 60 
There were several levels of troop organization. The 
soldier could claim membership in each of these groups as one 
was a sub-division of the other. Some groups were of much 
greater significance to the soldier than others. 61 Some 
58savage and Gabriel "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
American Army'' 
59winter Death's Men p.55. 
60winter, Death's Men p.52. 
61A section had 15 men, Platoon: 60. Company: 250. Battalion: 
1000. Regiment: 2000. Brigade: 4000. Division: 12 000. Corps: 50 
000. Army: 200 000. Winter Death's Men p.53. 
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designations, such as the army or corps, were far too large 
and impersonal to be remembered as important by the soldier. 
The division was the largest unit to have any significance to 
the individual. 
The division was a self-contained unit which had its own 
identity and was employed in battle as a single entity. This 
amount of continuity promoted a kind familiarity which made 
the division a recognizable entity to its own men, and to the 
men in other divisions. A sense of esprit de corps evolved at 
the divisional level. The author of The Story of the 29th 
Division called it divisional esprit de corps and suggested 
that it was "self consciousness ... engendered by a sense of 
solidarity in success and failure.n 62 
Winter identifies the small group as the section, 
composed of 15 men, or possibly the platoon which contained 60 
men. 63 These smaller groups meant more to the men because 
they were more intimate and would therefore engender a 
stronger sense of belonging and solidarity. The same argument 
may be made for the company which had 250 men at full strength 
and was commanded by a captain. The company was the smallest 
62stair Gillon The Story of the 29th Division (London: Nelson; 
1925) p.v. 
63winter Death's Men p.54. Winter's primary group is based on 
the experience of post-attrition units. In that case, the section 
might be the primary group only after the man's battalion ceased to 
exist. 
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"self contained" tactical unit in the Army complete with its 
own specialists such as mortar bombers and machine gunners. 
However, it is the battalion with which the soldier most 
strongly identified. 64 
The battalion is the focus of the present study of the 
Newfoundland Regiment in World War I. That the 1000 men of a 
single battalion constituted one primary group may be 
difficult to accept initially. It will be argued later that 
the sense of community developed in a properly composed 
battalion demonstrates many of the attributes of cohesion 
usually only associated with the primary group. In the way the 
battalion functions as an organizational entity, it is 
reasonable to refer to it as a primary group. The current 
research into the Newfoundland battalion demonstrates that in 
this case, the battalion behaved as a primary group. 
It is sufficient to say that the size of the group is a 
significant factor in the cohesion and morale of its members 
and to the unit as a corporate entity. The characteristics of 
cohesion discussed here refer to the smaller group. The small 
group, distinguished by personal relationships, is the 
"primary group" and the larger unit, such as the division, may 
64see: Keith Simpson, "The British Soldier on the Western 
Front" in Home Fires and Foreign Fields P.Liddle (ed.) (London: 
Brassey's; 1985) p.l47. and Winter, Death's Men p.54. 
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be described as the "secondary group". 65 
The group solidarity as displayed by a cohesive unit may 
also be observed in examples of indiscipline. The "mutinies 
over disbandment" in the Australian infantry demonstrate this 
point but it also demonstrates the significance of the 
battalion to the soldier. In September of 1918, the 25th, 
37th, and 54th battalions were all under-strength and were 
ordered to disband so that the remaining men could reinforce 
other units. 66 In total, seven battalions refused the order 
and demanded that they be allowed to go into battle with their 
identities intact. Military discipline was maintained within 
the "striking" battalions and rations were provided by other 
Australian units who supported their mates' act of 
indiscipline. 67 Against the united front of battalion 
solidarity, the Australian commanders retracted the orders, 
reprieved the mutineers and found alternative arrangements for 
the under strength battalions. 68 
65Manning "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps" p.458. A 
Secondary Group is " ... an impersonal [bond] relating soldier to 
institution rather than soldier to soldier as in the case of unit 
cohesion." 
66Patsy Adam-Smith, The ANZACS (London:Hamish Hamilton;1978) 
p.320. and C.E.W. Bean Official History of Australia in the War of 
1914-18 Vol.VI. p.938. 
67J.Fuller Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.24. 
68P.Adam-Smith The ANZACS p.321. and J.Fuller Troop Morale and 
Popular Culture p.24. 
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One other example of unit loyalty and indiscipline is to 
be found in the only British mutiny of the Second World War. 
The "Salerno Mutiny", of September 1943, occurred when 192 
battle hardened men of a particular draft refused to be posted 
to a unit other than their own. 69 That they righteously 
refused to report to a different division demonstrates the 
high morale and solidarity of the cohesive unit. The men were 
court martial led but had their sentences suspended. 70 Both 
examples serve to illustrate the dynamic of the group. The 
primary group has incredible influence upon its membership. It 
commands extraordinary loyalty and can determine behaviour. 
Obviously the "mutineers" felt strong attachments to the group 
and it was the battalion to which they showed loyalty. The 
cohesive group need not always be the obedient group but it is 
important that the action, whether obedient or disobedient, is 
conducted within the group. 
Three elements can be considered to be contributing to 
good unit cohesion. They are: a common social background, the 
shared experience, and confidence. These all help to engender 
a sense of identity within the group. 
Manning claims that the common social background creates 
a homogeneous unit whereas the heterogeneous unit tends to 
69Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second 
World War p.216. 
70Ahrenfeldt Psychiatry in the British Army p.216. 
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discourage unit cohesion. 71 The traditional British county 
regiment recruited from the same area and would therefore, at 
least theoretically, have a better chance of achieving 
homogeneity within the ranks. I will demonstrate that the 
Newfoundland Regiment was similarly a homogeneous unit. 
The shared experience is the factor which contributes the 
most in groups which exhibit high degrees of cohesion. 
Increasing the opportunities for interaction within the group 
will promote cohesion. "The primary group must remain intact 
and in close contact long enough to accumulate a significant 
body of common experience. 1172 Obviously, the group in which 
the membership is constantly changing, either due to 
reassignment or casualties, has less chance to build a 
critical mass of shared experience. The administration of 
personnel is crucial in this respect. 
The shared experiences promote the development of the 
interpersonal bonding necessary for good cohesion. This 
bonding cannot be achieved if the membership of the group is 
constantly in flux. The sharing of experiences continues in 
all aspects of the life of the group and can be described as 
the continuity of service. It can be observed in activities 
such as training together, being hospitalized together, and it 
71Manning "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps" p.462. 
72Manning "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps" p.462. 
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is certainly a significant factor which bonds the survivors of 
combat closer together. 
If the shared experience is the necessary ingredient in 
a cohesive group, then its opposite would be the concept of 
"turbulence". This is the movement of personnel in or out of 
the group which inhibits the forging of personal bonds and is 
detrimental to the morale, cohesion and efficiency of the 
unit. In The Anatomy of Courage, Lord Moran recognized the 
problem of turbulence. He observed that in the British 
infantry in World War One, 
.... companies in the line were perturbed when 
a proved and seasoned soldier was hit: they knew 
that when he was fit he would be sent to another 
unit and that his place might be taken by some 
raw conscript. 73 
Savage and Gabriel blamed the disintegration of morale and 
cohesion in the American Army in Vietnam on the policy of 
individual rotation in and out of groups. 74 The individual 
was not able to make the close personal bonds necessary to 
engender feelings of solidarity or identity with the group. 
His presence then became a disruptive factor to the well being 
of the other members of the group. The primary group, and with 
73Moran, The Anatomy of Courage p.181. See also Ahrenfeldt 
Psychiatry in the British Army p.204. "changes in the group". 
74savage and Gabriel "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
American Army" p.341. 
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it cohesion, was destroyed by the rotation system. 75 
Turbulence in the small group prevents the members of the 
group from building up a critical mass of common experiences. 
The interpersonal bonds are therefore not as evident, and the 
group suffers from a lack of identity, and solidarity. Just as 
shared experiences contribute to cohesion, turbulence destroys 
it. 
According to Manning, the end point of homogeneity in 
composition and the shared experience, is to give the soldier 
confidence. 76 He should possess confidence in the abilities 
of himself, his peers and his leaders. The confidence in and 
the trust of the other members of the group result in the 
mutual identification and co-operative effort which Cooley 
identified as the definitive characteristics of the primary 
group. If the group then demonstrates cohesion and behaves in 
a manner befitting that cliched "well oiled machine", then it 
is said to be an "effective group". The shared experience and 
homogeneity of membership are props which contribute to the 
cohesion. Confidence is indicative of good cohesion but is 
supported by the first two elements. 
These elements allow the relationships to develop within 
the group. They promote the bonding which leads to feelings of 
75savage and Gabriel "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
American Army" p.341. 
76Manning "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps" p.463. 
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solidarity, unity or a sense of belonging. Cohesion then, as 
well as morale can be created, promoted and maintained. The 
task remains to identify, within a particular group, the 
absence or presence of the factors which contribute to high 
morale and good cohesion. The Newfoundland Regiment is the 
group in question. By identifying the constituent parts of 
cohesion and morale in this regiment, it may be possible to 
gain a greater understanding of the Newfoundlanders' 
particular experience of war. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE IDEA OF THE REGIMENT 
The regiment was an essential element in the creation and 
maintenance of morale. It has been suggested that, with 
regards to the stability of British morale in the First World 
War, "the impact of the regimental tradition and its local 
identity cannot be overestimated." 1 Indeed, John Keegan 
recognized the influence of the regiment in the lives of new 
recruits in England: 
The volunteers who flocked forward in 1914 ... 
went forward not to disappear inside a faceless 
juggernaut, but to join an identifiable unit 
whose reputation was a point of local folklore. 2 
Keegan compares this "identifiable unit" to a large 
family with strong ties to the community. 3 As a part of the 
British Army, the Newfoundlanders who enlisted were organized 
into a regiment of their own. The regiment, as an institution, 
is a highly effective way through which to approach the 
soldiers' experience. It would be instructive then, to take a 
closer look at the British regiment and how it came to exist 
1 Ian Beckett. "The Nation in Arms, 1914-18" in A Nation in 
Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War Ian 
Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.) (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press; 1985) p.24. 
2John Keegan "Regimental Ideology" in War Economy and the 
Military Mind A.Wheatcroft (Eds.) (London: Croom Helm; 1976) p.11. 
3Keegan "Regimental Ideology" p.11. 
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in the particular form it took in the summer of 1914. 
The origins and evolution of the regiment in the British 
Army have been discussed elsewhere. 4 It is beyond the scope 
of this study to detail the history of this institution from 
earliest times. The story of the regiment, as was recognizable 
in 1914, begins with Edward Cardwell's tenure as Secretary of 
State for War from 1868 to 1874. It was the Cardwellian 
reforms that emphasised the importance of the regiment as the 
basic unit of army administration. Cardwell's system remained, 
with only slight modifications by R.B.Haldane, up to the 
outbreak of the War. 5 The concept of the regiment familiar to 
soldiers and civilians during the First World War had been in 
existence for some forty years. 
Cardwell's reforms were largely an effort to rationalize 
the Army to make it more efficient and, most important, more 
economical for the purpose of policing the empire. 6 The 
4Especially; Ian Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-
1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991); Ian Beckett 
and John Gooch (eds.), Politicians and Defence 1845-1970 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press: 1981) and Edward Spiers, 
The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London: Longman; 1980). 
5spiers The Army and Society pp.267-75. In 1907 Richard Burdon 
Haldane (later Viscount Haldane of Clean) rationalized the militia, 
yeomanry and volunteers into what became the Territorial Army 
(T.A.) and planned to use the regular army as an expeditionary 
force and to keep the T.A. for home defence. 
6Anthony Bruce "Edward Cardwell and the Abolition of Purchase" 
in Ian Beckett and John Gooch (eds.) Politicians and Defence 1845-
1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1981) p.26. Also see 
Keegan "Regimental Ideology" p.7. 
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growth of regimental spirit and ideology was an accidental 
product of Cardwell's reorganization. 7 The reforms were 
promulgated in three Acts of Parliament between 1870 and 1872. 
"The Enlistment Act" (1870) reduced the enlisted man's career 
from twenty-one to twelve years (Six years with the colours 
and six in the reserves) . "The Regulation of Forces Act" 
(1871) abolished the purchase of commissions and introduced 
the promotion by means of seniority and merit. "The Military 
Localization Act" ( 1872) created the "linked battalion" system 
in which each regiment would be attached to a specific region , 
such as a county or a city. While one of the Regiment's two 
Battalions was in Britain training and recruiting, the other 
was performing the duties of the Imperial garrison. 8 Although 
it was the abolition of the purchase of commissions for which 
Cardwell is best known, for the regiment, it was the 
localization scheme that was the essence of the reforms. 
"The Military Localization Act" gave each regiment more 
than the specific "catchment basin" for recruits , as was the 
intended result. The regiment now had a "home", a focus of 
regimental life and, conversely, the regiment became a focus 
of community life. It created local pride in the regiment 
7 David Weston "The Army: Mother, Sister and Mistress: The 
British Regiment" in M.Edmonds (ed.) The Defence Equation: British 
Military Systems. Policy, Planning and Performance (London : 
Brassey's; 1986) p.139. 
8 spiers, The Army and Society pp.189-196. 
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which was not previously evident. 9 It guaranteed local 
feeling, which one author argues, was "epitomized by the 
phenomena of the 'Pals Battalions'" in the First World War. 10 
Comparisons between the "Pals Battalions" and the Royal 
Newfoundland Regiment will be made later in this study. It is 
sufficient to say at this stage that the local pride in the 
regiment and the Newfoundland Regiment's identification with 
the community are crucial to understanding the relationship 
between the soldier and his unit and the creation of morale 
within that unit. 
The other effects of the Cardwellian reforms were felt 
within the regiment. With the abolition of the purchase 
system, an officer could seek promotion and advancement only 
within the framework of his own regiment . This meant that an 
officer would spend his entire career in the same unit thus 
strengthening ties with the other ranks and promoting greater 
continuity within the regiment as a social entity. 11 For 
soldiers spending long periods of time garrisoning the Empire 
the regiment provided a social function. As the soldier was 
far from home, often in an alien culture, the regiment acted 
9 Keegan, "Regimental Ideology" p.lO. 
10weston "British Regiments" p.l44. 
11weston "British Regiment" p.l43. 
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as a surrogate family - a very close knit family. 12 It is 
unrealistic to make a direct comparison between the battalions 
of long service professional soldiers which policed the Empire 
and the battalions of volunteers which fought in Great War. On 
the other hand, the idea of the regiment remained unchanged 
and there are enough social parallels to suggest that "the 
concept of the family is still important to a real 
understanding of what a British Regiment means. 1113 
The creation of the regimental ethos can be attributed to 
Edward Cardwell, no matter how unintentional this result may 
have been. Cardwell's reforms made it possible for the "county 
regiment" to develop its three distinguishing features. First, 
the other ranks, and to an extent, the officers, were 
recruited from the same region and would therefore have that 
one thing in common. Second, The Military Localization Act of 
1872 created ties with the community that resulted in the 
identification of the regiment with the county and the county 
with its regiment and fostered mutual pride in that 
relationship. This, in part, gave the men of the regiment a 
greater sense of identity. Third, the rituals and traditions 
12J.Fuller, Trooo Morale and Pooular Culture in British and 
Dominion Armies 1914-18 (Oxford: Clarendon; 1992) p.23. Also 
Weston, "British Regiment" p.142. 
13Dennis Barker, Soldiering On: An Unofficial Portrait of the 
British Army (London: Andre Deutsch: 1981) p.104. Also: Weston 
"British Regiment" p.143. 
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of the regiment became more important as the regiment assumed 
greater importance as a social entity. The common place of 
origin, the identification with the county and the appeal to 
tradition are the three distinguishing features of the 
Cardwellian regiment. These, I would argue, are also the 
defining characteristics of any regiment that went into battle 
in 1914. Circumstances would change over the course of the war 
to shatter the reality of the "idea" of the regiment but if 
one was to speak of "the regiment" in 1914, this is what 
would be meant and would be understood by contemporaries. 14 
There are then two meanings for the noun "regiment". It 
could mean the actual structure of military administration, 
the details of which are outlined previously. It also means 
the regiment as a family with the correlates of family life 
such as identity, belonging, loyalty and an awareness of 
history and tradition. Keegan's comparison of the regiment to 
a large family with firm roots in the community is an 
appropriate one. It is important to remember, however, that 
while this was the concept of the British regiment, battle 
attrition soon changed the character of the beloved local 
regiments. 
The Newfoundlanders quickly became, what was to all 
14Nicholas Perry "Nationality in the Irish Infantry Regiments 
in the First World War" War and Society (1994) 12:1;68. 
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observers, a "traditional" regiment . The raising and 
administration of the regiment has been detailed elsewhere. 15 
Attention will be paid to how this regimental ethos was 
maintained throughout the war when other, more established 
regiments were having difficulty maintaining personnel and as 
a result, suffering serious lapses in morale and discipline. 
The word "regiment" therefore had two meanings. In the 
first sense, it was the soldier's "home" and "family", the 
particular prism through which the soldier's military 
experience would be seen and remembered. The other definition 
of regiment is the administrative meaning of the word. It is 
but one of the organizational units in the military hierarchy . 
In the pre-war army, a regiment had two thousand men and 
officers and was commanded by a colonel. A regiment was 
composed of two battalions ideally with some one thousand 
officers and men each. Under the Cardwell System, which lasted 
from 1881 to the outbreak of the war , one battal i on served at 
the depot in the British Isles and 
the other was on duty garrisoning the Empire. The battalion, 
then, was the basic operational unit of the British Army. 16 
15G.W.L. Nicholson The Fiahtina Newfoundlander {St.John's: 
Government of Newfoundland: 1964) and P.R. O'Brien, "The 
Newfoundland Patriotic Association: The Administration of the War 
Effort 1914-18" Unpublished M.A. Thesis (Memorial University Of 
Newfoundland , 1982) 
16Keith Simpson, "The British Soldier on the Western Front" 
p.147. 
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When war was declared, the strength of the British 
infantry stood at 157 battalions, 74 of which were overseas 
policing the empire. 17 Haldane's provisions for an 
expeditionary force and the establishment of the territorial 
army were designed for the contingency of an European war . 18 
However, the existing army of six divisions would need to be 
expanded to fight what was predicted, by Kitchener at least, 
to be a long war. On August 6, 1914, Kitchener, as Secretary 
of War, received parliamentary approval to expand the army by 
a half-million men and immediately made a public appeal for 
one hundred thousand volunteers. 19 With the explosion in 
recruitment, the army simply increased the number of 
battalions in a regiment rather than alter the structure of 
the infantry by creating several new regiments. The usual 
methods available to the War office for recruitment were found 
to be inadequate for the sudden flood of volunteers in early 
September. 2° Civilian recruiting committees headed by leading 
1 7 F.W.Perry The Commonwealth Armies: Man Power and 
Organisation in Two World Wars Manchester: Manchester University 
Press; 1988. p.7. 
18John Gooch, "Haldane and the National Army'' in Politicians 
and Defence Ian Beckett and John Gooch (eds.) Manchester: 
Manchester University Press; 1981. p.84 . 
19Keith Simpson, Kitchener's Army: The Raisino of the New 
Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester: University of Manchester Press; 1988. ) 
p. 39 . 
20simpson, Kitchener's Army p.75. 
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citizens sprang up and relieved the pressure on the recruiting 
centres of the Regular Army and Territorial Army. 
The most significant and best known result of the 
civilian recruiting effort was the creation of the Pals 
Battalions. These units were raised by local authorities and 
recruited men who "lived in a particular city or district , or 
who shared a common social or occupational background. 1121 
These units were added as service battalions to existing 
regiments and took the characteristics of the old regiment 
with the same sense of tradition, locality and social 
cohesion. The phenomenon of the Pals Battalions was not a rare 
example of local patriotic fervour as 215, or 38% of the 557 
volunteer battalions, were recruited by bodies other than the 
War Office. 22 The raising of the Pals Battalions most closely 
parallels the creation of the Regiment in Newfoundland. 
These men recruited in this way were attached to a 
battalion of the local regiment but were intended to remain 
together as a unit. The incentive given to enlist was the 
promise of serving with friends from civilian life. So the 
"Leeds Pals" were the 15th. Battalion of the West Yorkshire 
Regiment, the men of the North Western Railway formed the 17th 
21simpson, Kitchener's Army p.79. 
22 simpson, Kitchener's Army p.79. These 215 battalions were 
raised from the beginning of the War to the enacting of 
c onscription in 1916. 
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Battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers and the 16th 
Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment were known as the "Public 
Schools" Battalion. 
This feeling of being part of a community 
is arguably, another factor in the morale equation, 
for not only was the soldier serving with his home 
unit, he was also fighting alongside friends from 
the same area. 23 
Major-General Ivor Maxse, Commanding Officer of the 18th. 
Division, observed that the New Armies (volunteers) had a 
distinctive esprit de corps which came from their strong 
social cohesion. The way they were raised gave them a powerful 
local identity. The way they were trained afforded time for 
social bonding as the men came from a common background and 
class, often the men knew each other in peace and the officers 
had time to learn of the men's abilities and deficiencies. 24 
This esprit de corps makes perfect sense if it is seen as a 
function of the battalion behaving as a traditional British 
Army unit should, benefitting from the traditions of the 
parent regiment and the drawing from the camaraderie of the 
recruits. 
Keith Simpson suggested that the best vehicle for the 
creation and maintenance of institutional and group loyalty 
23weston "British Regiment" p.151. 
24simpson, Kitchener's Army p.317. 
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was the regimental system. 25 He added the caveat , however, 
that "The group loyalty of the British soldier on the western 
front did not extend beyond his own battalion ... " 26 Indeed, 
with some regiments having up to twenty and thirty battalions , 
the regiment was perhaps of less importance to the soldier 
than the particular battalion in which he fought. The 
attachment to the battalion, on the other hand , became 
stronger. 
The battalion has been described as being like "a small 
town, full of remembered faces, shared experiences and old 
friends." 27 It has been argued that it was the battalion with 
which the soldier identified since it was this unit that 
earned a reputation in battle and gave a soldier his "prestige 
as a fighting man." 28 When convalescing at the Newfoundland 
Regiment Is depot from an illness contracted at Gallipoli' Cpl e 
John Gallishaw wrote, "We're tired of the depot already. 
They're a new bunch here and we want to get back with the 
25Keith Simpson, "The British Soldier on the Western Front" in 
Home Fires and Foreign Fields Peter Liddle (ed.) p.147. 
26Keith Simpson, "The British Soldier on the Western Front" 
p.147. 
27oesmond Morton, When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier 
in The First World War (Toronto: Random House; 1993.) p.77. 
28oenis Winter Death's Men: Soldiers of the Great War (London: 
Penguin; 1978) p.54. 
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crowd we know. 1129 He continued this sentiment with, "I hated 
to leave the men of the first battalion some of their 
names I did not know but they were all my friends. nJO The 
battalion therefore became the focus of the soldier's life. 
All his experiences were coloured by the environment of the 
battalion and by the men with whom he served. 
The regiment from Newfoundland had only one operational 
battalion named, somewhat presumptuously, the 1st. (Battalion) 
Newfoundland Regiment. In the letters, memoirs and diaries, 
the terms battalion and regiment are used interchangeably. 
There was a second battalion at Ayr, Scotland, which later 
moved to Hazeley Down, Winchester, which served as the head-
quarters depot. This battalion acted only in an administrative 
capacity and the strength never rose above two companies or 
about five hundred men. New recruits were sent to the depot 
for training and convalescing soldiers returned to the 
regiment via the depot. 
All British infantry regiments were, theoretically , 
organized and administered the same way. Each had a depot 
located in their recruiting area which supplied the battalion 
at the front with reinforcements. This system maintained the 
soldiers' continuity of service within the same battalion and 
29John Gallishaw Trenching at Gallipoli p.235. 
30Gallishaw, Trenching at Gallipoli p.236. 
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permitted men from the same region to serve together . This 
system changed drastically when the heavy casualties of the 
Somme in 1916 created a manpower shortage. 
The "training reserve" battalions were introduced in 
September of 1916 and men were sent to reinforce any unit 
wherever they were needed, regardless of regimental 
affiliation. The effects of these changes will be examined in 
greater detail later in this study. It is sufficient to say, 
the battalion's ties to a region or city were severed and its 
men could no longer claim exclusive membership in a particular 
unit. This new reinforcement policy shattered unit cohesion 
and made the promotion of morale an almost impossible task. 
The dislocation of the man from his unit caused by the 
"training reserve" battalions effectively destroyed the 
Cardwell ian ideal of the regiment. The Newfoundlanders, partly 
because they were a national contingent, were not subject to 
the reinforcement policy and thus survived as a Cardwellian-
style regiment. While other battalions were falling apart, the 
Newfoundland Regiment carried on with its identity intact 
thereby avoiding the serious problems of morale and cohesion 
affecting the British Army generally after 1916. 
The Newfoundland battalion maintained its unique identity 
because it functioned the way that regiments were supposed to 
function under the old regimental administrative system. The 
Newfoundland contingent operated like many other regionally 
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recruited regiments with a reserve depot in Britain and the 
battalion in the field. This maintained the continuity which 
supported a sense of community and regimental spirit. Because 
the Newfoundland Regiment had its own administrative 
structure, distinct from that of the British Army, it was able 
to control the movement of its men when they were not at the 
front. As in the case of other "undiluted" units such as the 
Royal Naval Division or the Guards Division, it was largely 
administrative factors which physically kept the unit 
together. 31 These factors contributed to the strong unit 
cohesion and regimental spirit of the Newfoundland Regiment 
for the duration of the war. This was because the regiment 
continued an association with the older, Cardwell ian, 
regimental structure characterized by a common place of 
origin, identification with the community and the appeal to 
tradition. 
Local identity had been the telling characteristic of the 
traditional British regiment. Before long, the Newfoundland 
Regiment very soon assumed the appearance of a typical British 
Regiment. The Newfoundland Regiment was composed almost 
exclusively of Newfoundland residents32 , 52 percent of whom 
31J.Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p . 8. 
32 Of 6061 recruits, only 62 men enlisted in Great Britain 
including 36 in the regimental band, some Newfoundlanders resident 
in Britain and some ex-British Army as instructors and Headquarters 
staff. Statistics of The Military Effort p.774. 
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came from the capital, st.John's. 33 Colonel Nicholson, the 
official historian of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment wrote: 
" ... no other body of troops was so singularly and closely 
identified with the community from which it came. 1134 Their 
identity was self-evident. They were Newfoundland's national 
contingent. A regiment composed of local boys with familiar 
names became the focus of the war for the people at home in 
Newfoundland. It became the single identifiable group in whose 
achievements all Newfoundlanders could take pride and whose 
dead a nation could collectively mourn. In local parlance, 
both among soldiers and civilians, the regiment was simply 
nicknamed "Ours". 35 
The third characteristic of the British regiment was the 
appeal to tradition. Lacking a military tradition, the 
Newfoundlanders had to build one quickly. This was achieved by 
adopting the traditions of the British Army and by developing 
new ones as they gained wartime experience. Another source was 
the colony's long and proud history. 
In the British Army, distinctive traditions set each 
regiment apart and even distinguished between battalions 
33sharpe "The 'Race of Honour': An Analysis of Enlistments and 
Casualties in the Armed Forces of Newfoundland 1914-18" p.37. 
34G.W.L. Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander (St.John's: 
Government of Newfoundland; 1964.) p.xiii. 
35Frank Lind The Letters of Mayo Lind A.Robinson (ed) 
(St.John's, Creative: 1919) 
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within the same regiments. 36 The Newfoundlanders quickly 
adopted the traditions and forms of the British Army such as 
the rank structure and marching drill as well as bugle calls 
and colour parades. 37 When they joined the 29th Division in 
September of 1915, they became part of a "famous", elite unit 
with a well earned reputation for toughness and military 
efficiency. 38 A second source of tradition was the heritage 
of the nation itself. "Britain's oldest colony" was a common 
patriotic epithet for Newfoundland. 39 Newfoundlanders did not 
have to be reminded of their national history and traditions. 
The third source of tradition was naturally occurring and came 
from within the battalion itself. The regiment soon had its 
own distinctive badge, regimental colours and Newfoundland dog 
mascot. From their active service few would forget names like 
Gallipoli and Beaumont-Hamel. Despite the fact that the 
Newfoundland Regiment was new and created from scratch, the 
traditions characteristic of the British Army were quickly 
adopted and then built upon by the regiment as it gained in 
36see Baynes, Morale pp.18-21. 
37G.W.L. Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.113. 
38Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p. 168. See also: 
Fuller, Troop Morale p.30. and Keegan The Face of Battle p.216 . 
39see: Journal and Proceedinas of the House of Assemblv 
(Second Session of the 23rd General Assembly) Sept. 05, 1914. p.5. 
Governor Davidson " .. the sons of Britain's oldest colony" and The 
Royal Gazette "Speech from the Throne" April 7, 1915. p.1. 
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experience and achievement. These were the traditions which 
served to create and maintain esprit; de corps and morale 
within the unit. 
A discernible regimental system existed in the British 
Army at the outbreak of the First World War . Voluntary 
recruitment in Great Britain followed this regimental pattern. 
This was the system into which the Newfoundland Regiment fit. 
The Newfoundland Regiment was organized, administered, and 
operated in the manner of a traditional British regiment. 
Therefore it was, and remained throughout the war, a 
"Cardwellian" regiment. 
In this study, the soldier's experience of war is being 
examined through the framework of the regiment in which he 
served. It has been suggested that, "As a creator of morale, 
the alliance between the man and his regiment has no 
equal." 40 I would suggest that the soldiers from Newfoundland 
were well served by their relationship to their regiment. I 
will demonstrate that the experience of the Newfoundland 
soldier was significantly different because the morale and 
cohesion of the Newfoundland Regiment was significantly better 
than in most other British Regiments. The main reason for thi s 
was simply that the Newfoundland Regiment continued to 
function as a traditional British regiment long after other 
40Trevor Royle, Anatomy of A Regiment p.80. 
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regiments could not. 
CHAPTER THREE 
MANPOWER, ATTRITION AND THE DEMISE 
OF THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM 
Attrition killed the Cardwellian regimental system. The 
war affected the traditional regimental system such that the 
battalion's importance to the soldier as a "family" diminished 
to the point of insignificance. At the end of the war few 
soldiers could identify with their unit or feel the strength 
of loyalty known by pre-war regulars. Unlike the other British 
infantry units, the Newfoundlanders preserved the 
characteristics of a traditional regiment throughout the war. 
It will be demonstrated that battalion, as described by the 
Cardwellian system, ceased to exist by late 1916 and that 
cohesion and morale suffered as a result. 
It has been argued that the battalion acted as an agent 
or facilitator of morale. The precondition to group morale is 
strong unit cohesion which is based upon what the sociological 
literature calls, the "primary group". With attrition, changes 
occurred to the organization of the battalion which impaired 
the unit's performance as a primary group and in its ability 
to foster the primary group. When the battalion lost control 
over the administration of its men, the ability of the 
battalion to preserve the primary group was severely 
restricted. When circumstances occurred such that the primary 
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group was either diluted or destroyed, morale suffered and the 
soldier's experience of that unit changed. 
The problem was one of attrition. The changes to the 
battalion were caused by the inability of the army to 
consistently reinforce the unit in the field with men from the 
same battalion. There were two major institutional changes in 
the way soldiers and their battalions were administered by the 
army. The first, in September 1916, was the creation of the 
"Training Reserve" Battalions. 41 The second measure was the 
rationalization of the brigade from four battalions to three 
in January 1918. 42 In both cases the object was to keep all 
divisions up to strength and readily supplied with 
reinforcements to replace those who had fallen. In both cases 
the measures had adverse effects upon morale and cohesion. 
Before the effects of the administrative changes are 
discussed, the conditions that caused the changes must be 
addressed. 
Insufficient manpower was at the root of the trouble. The 
changes were brought about by the need to maintain a force in 
41cli ve Hughes, "The New Armies" in A Nation in Arms Ian 
Beckett and Keith Simpson ( eds. ) (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press; 1985) p.114. 
42Brent Wilson "Morale and Discipline in the British 
Expeditionary Force" Unpublished M.A. Thesis (University of New 
Brunswick 1978) p.265. 
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the field of well over a million men on the Western Front. 43 
Men were being killed or wounded faster than they could be 
replaced. The (2nd) Scottish Rifles was decimated at the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle, March 10, 1915, and yet, two months 
later, the battalion was in action again with 800 new men. 
Their historian wrote, "They carried on in name, but the men 
were entirely different". 44 Heavy British losses were also 
sustained at the Battle of Laos (September 1915) and in the 
Gallipoli campaign (April to December 1915). British voluntary 
recruitment tapered off after the initial patriotic enthusiasm 
had died down and conscription was enacted in England, 
Scotland and Wales in January of 1916. 45 The manpower 
shortage was not solved by compulsory service. The year 1916 
is remembered for the Battle of the Somme and its 
inconceivable carnage: 
it was the casualty rate which determined 
a unit's survival as a recognized entity 
disintegration was greatly accelerated with 
the heavy casualties on the Somme. 46 
July 1, 1916, was the single worst day for the British 
43Troop strength on the Western Front: 1916: 1,378,663. For 
1917: 1,800,705. and for 1918: 1,763,980. As quoted in K.Simpson 
"The British Soldier on the Western Front" p.137. 
44Baynes, Morale p.9. 
45winter, neath's Men p.29. 
46 ran Beckett The Amateur Military Tradition p.232. 
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Army in the First World War. On that one day, the British 
suffered 57,470 casualties, 19,240 of which were fatal. 47 The 
first of July is remembered as Memorial Day in Newfoundland. 
The beginning of the Battle of the Somme was the bloodiest day 
for the Newfoundland Regiment. Before the battle of Beaumont-
Hamel, the battalion strength stood at 801 men and 
officers. 48 After the battle, 710 had become casualties, 272 
of which were fatal. 49 Newfoundland's only battalion lost 
eighty nine per-cent of its number in less than an hour. 
Before the regiment's next action at Gueudecourt, on 
October 10, the battalion strength had risen to 601 men and 
officers but was still 400 men short of a full battalion. 50 
The Newfoundland Regiment had begun the process of rebuilding 
while maintaining a sense of identity. It took until December 
for the strength of the unit to rise to the pre-Somme mark of 
47John Terraine The Smoke and The Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths 
of War (London: Sidgwick and Jackson; 1980) p.45. and Nicholson The 
Fighting Newfoundlander p.277. 
48Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.262. The strength 
was: 25 officers (0) and 776 Other Ranks (O.R.) 
49Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander pp.274-6. J.B. Cave 
What Became of Corporal Pittman? (St.John's: Breakwater; 1976) 
Appendix "A". and W.D. Parsons Pilorimaoe: A Guide to the 
Newfoundland Regiment in World War I. (St.John's: Creative; 1994). 
50Public Record Office (P.R.O.) W.0./95/2308 Newfoundland 
Regiment War Diary: October 14, 1916. Strength before battle: 29 
Officers and 572 O.R. Casualties: 10 Officers, 229 O.R. 
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800. 51 As the example of Beaumont-Hamel demonstrates, the 
Newfoundlanders were beginning to learn about attrition, about 
the constant wearing down of men and materiel. This was not a 
unique experience: the Newfoundland Regiment was just one of 
143 British battalions that attacked on the first day of the 
Somme. 52 This problem was one shared by all of the army. 
The problem was straight forward: high casualties left 
vacancies at the front that needed to be filled. The solution 
was more difficult. Reinforcements, most often routed through 
regimental or battalion depots, were not getting to the front 
fast enough or in sufficient numbers. The familiar methods of 
reinforcement were quickly discarded in favour of a more 
centralized system of manpower replacement. 53 
The Newfoundlanders and all other locally raised 
battalions were ordered to create depot companies in December 
1914. In 1915, these companies became reserve battalions 
designed to provide drafts of reinforcements for the parent 
units already at the front. 54 In this way, even the newly 
created battalions were able to maintain links with the local 
51P.R.O. W.0./95/2308 Regimental Diary; December 26, 1916 . 
Also, Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.285. 
52Keegan, The Face of Battle p.216. 97 of the 143 battalions 
were "war raised" units just like the Newfoundland battalion. 
53william Moore The Thin Yellow Line (New York: St. Martins 
Press; 1975) p.87. 
54simpkins, Kitchener's Army p.313. 
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recruiting area and continuity of service for the men and 
officers. 
The Newfoundland Regiment maintained a depot in Britain 
at which new recruits were trained and the wounded recovered 
before going back to the front. There new recruits were able 
to mix with the veterans and any member of the regiment who 
was wounded or sick would be returned to the unit by way of 
the regimental depot. The depot promoted continuity. New 
recruits were drawn from the same region as the old soldiers 
which helped preserve the homogeneous composition of the 
battalion. Continuity and homogeneity are two of the essential 
components of strong unit cohesion. 55 The regimental depot, 
in preserving homogeneity and promoting continuity, 
strengthened unit cohesion. 
These local reserve depots were discontinued after the 
disastrous casual ties suffered in July of 1916, with the 
beginning of the Battle of the Somme. In September of 1916 , 
the local reserves were replaced by "training reserve" 
battalions. These units, "shorn of regimental connections 
disrupted any strong local link by sending drafts from what 
was effectively a common pool of conscript manpower. 1156 
55Manning, "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps" p.462. 
56clive Hughes "The New Armies" in A Nation in Arms !.Beckett 
and K. Simpson ( eds.) (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 
1985) p.114. 
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One hundred and twelve "training reserve" battalions were 
established in September 1916. 57 These holding units were 
composed of newly conscripted men and men returning from being 
wounded. Drafts of soldiers from several different units were 
sent to fill the depleted battalions. 58 One author identifies 
the creation of the "training reserve" battalions as the event 
that ended the distinctiveness of Britain's volunteer army. 59 
Volunteers, and after April 1916, conscripts, would be placed 
into this "common pool" and largely sent to where they were 
needed regardless of battalion affiliations. In Siegfried 
Sassoon' s Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, the character George 
Sherston complains upon returning to the front from being 
wounded. 
I'd been posted to the Second Battalion; this 
gave me something definite to grumble about, for 
I wanted to go where I was known and the prospect 
of joining a strange battalion made me feel more 
homeless than ever. 60 
The men of the Newfoundland Regiment, because it was the 
national regiment, were not mixed in with the "common pool of 
57 F.W.Perry, The Commonwealth Armies (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press; 1988) p.20. 
58w.Moore, The Thin Yellow Line p.87. 
59Hughes, "The New Armies" p.114. 
60siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer 
(London:Faber and Faber:1930} p.168. This incident is based in 
fact. He recorded in a memoir of March 12, 1917: "I had been posted 
elsewhere than to the 1st Batt. which I regarded as my spiritual 
home in France." Dunn The War The Infantry Knew p.307. 
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conscripts". The Newfoundlanders were therefore able to 
maintain their identity long after the other "local" regiments 
such as the "Pals Battalions" had lost their distinctiveness. 
The preservation of a reserve depot was one of the 
organizational elements which contributed to the continued 
operation of the battalion as a traditional British regiment. 
Within the British army, only two divisions were 
unaffected by this change: the Royal Naval Division (R.N.D.), 
and the Guards Division. The Royal Naval Division presents an 
interesting case in the high degree of success this unit had 
in maintaining continuity and thereby supporting morale and 
cohesion. The R.N.D. was an infantry division composed of 
regular Royal Marines, Naval reservists and a number of army 
recruits. John Fuller states that only the Guards (1st 
Division) and the R.N.D. (63rd Division), were immune from the 
interchange of battalions and personnel which so changed the 
character of other units in the British Army. 61 
Unlike other units, the R.N.D. managed to keep a depot in 
Britain throughout the war. There, a sense of esprit de corps 
was maintained by a continuity of personnel, both of officers 
and men. When men were wounded at the front, they were 
hospitalized together and were returned to this depot for 
training before being reunited with the unit in the field. 
61John Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.8. 
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Similarly, the officers and non-commissioned officers 
(N.C.O.s) came from within the same battalion, providing 
another instance of continuity. The comradeship and pride grew 
as the veterans returned to the depot and mixed with the new 
recruits. Esprit de corps, morale and cohesion were 
strengthened by the existence of the permanent depot in 
Britain. 62 
The depot was a home and the division became the family. 
Comradeship developed here whereas in other units it did not 
because there was a continuity of men and officers. Unlike the 
men of the other regiments, the men of the R.N. D. were 
sustained by a feeling of belonging to a particular constant 
family. This organizational anomaly was made possible by a 
quirk of administration. The R.N.D. was the self-contained 
branch of the Royal Navy which served on land and fought as 
infantry. As such, reinforcements had to come from the 
relatively small pool of men in the Division. Similarly, the 
officers all belonged to the unit and as it was a branch of 
the Royal Navy, neither the officers nor the men could be 
replaced by a member of any other regiment and conversely, 
none of the men of the R.N.D. could be used to fill in spaces 
in other regiments. The Division maintained its unique 
identity because it functioned the way that regiments were 
62Douglas Jerrold, The Royal Naval Division 
Hutchinson; 1923.) pp.51-54. 
(London: 
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supposed to, under the old regimental administrative system. 
In contrast, the "training reserve" battalions 
interrupted the local association between the region and the 
battalion and, more important, the link between the soldier 
and his battalion. 63 This disruption had a serious effect on 
the unit's function of promoting cohesion and solidarity 
through the primary group. In their seminal study of cohesion 
and disintegration in World War Two, Shils and Janowitz 
observed that deterioration of group solidarity occurred 
mostly in hastily fabricated units. 64 As a result, the 
recruit who was thrown into a new unit and not fully 
integrated as a member of the group, was more prone to shell 
shock. 65 The replacement system also had a deleterious effect 
upon the surviving members of the group. In The Anatomy of 
Courage, Moran observed that when a seasoned soldier was 
wounded, it affected his company as they knew that "when he 
was fit he would be sent to another unit and his place would 
be taken by some raw conscript. " 66 The dilution of the 
battalion with outsiders was damaging to the cohesion of the 
63Hughes, "The New Armies" p.114. 
64shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
Wehrmacht in World War II" p.288. 
65Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army p.215. Also: Copp 
and MacAndrew Battle Exhaustion p.lOO. 
66Moran, The Anatomy of Courage p.l81. 
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unit, and therefore adversely affected the esprit and morale 
of the men. With the mounting casualties, it was 
impractical and impossible to maintain the policy of 
reinforcing men to specific units. Previous to the 
establishment of the "training reserve" units, each battalion 
could call upon the reserve depot in Britain for drafts. 
Ideally, the depot would train new recruits and reintegrate 
men returning from sickness or being wounded. The drafts from 
these companies would, theoretically, reinforce the same 
battalion in the field. 67 
However, since there were not separate reserve companies 
for every battalion at the front, the replacements for these 
units in the field might have come from other regiments and 
would have little in common with the rest of the men. 68 For 
the soldier who thought of his battalion as his home, being 
posted to another unit was a traumatic experience. It was said 
that soldiers were "shuffled round into depleted regiments 
like cards in a pack. n 69 A non-commissioned officer of a 
battalion nicknamed the "Birmingham Fusiliers" complained on 
July 28th, 1916, that "as drafts came in we became less 
67simpkins, Kitchener's Army p.313. 
68Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.43. 
69winter, Death's Men p.52. 
67 
English and more Welsh." 70 The high casualties of the Battle 
of the Somme demonstrated the drawbacks of recruiting from a 
narrow regional base, as in the case of the Pals Battalions 
and the Newfoundland Regiment. Driven by the needs of the 
battalions at the front and the difficulty of administering 
the segregated system of troop replacement, the training 
reserves were established and reinforcements were sent where 
they were needed. 71 
Battalion morale and cohesion suffered as a result of 
this reinforcement policy. The Medical Officer of the 2nd 
Royal Welch Fusiliers recorded that in July of 1916, "men 
recruited and trained by the Cheshires, Shropshires and the 
South Wales Borders arrived resentful of their transfer and 
unwanted by us." 72 He continued, "The quality of drafts made 
those who were used to a different personnel fearful for our 
immediate future. 1173 The new reality was that a soldier would 
not serve with the same unit throughout the war. This constant 
change of personnel is what would later be described as 
70ounn, The War the Infantry Knew p.246. (R.Q.M.S. T.Powell) 
71Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.43. 
72J.C.Dunn The War The Infantry Knew p.245. 
73ounn, The war the Infantry Knew p.245. 
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"turbulence". 74 This referred to the personal turbulence of 
the individual being shunted around as well as the disquieting 
effect the personnel changes had on the membership of the 
unit. 
The institution of the battalion was being whittled away 
in everything but name. Due to the correlates of high casualty 
rates and "indiscriminate" reinforcement practices, the 
battalions "steadily lost any real connection with the 
particular locality or social group from which they might have 
been raised." 75 
For the Irish regiments, there was the contentious issue 
of non-Irishmen fighting in Irish units. This became a 
necessity as the proportion of Irish born serving in Irish 
formations fell from 86 percent in 1914 to 56 percent at the 
end of the war. 76 The postal censors reported that, in 
letters home from the front, "The 36th (Ulster) Division 
complained that they are being made up with drafts of non-
74see: Savage and Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the 
American Army" in Armed Forces and Society (1976) 2:3;362. and 
Beckett, "The British Army: The Illusion of Change" p.110. 
75I. Beckett "The British Army 1914-18: The Illusion of Change" 
in Britain and the First World War J.Turner (ed) (London: Unwin 
Hyman; 1988) p.110. 
76Nicholas Perry, "Nationality in the Irish Infantry Regiments 
in the First World War" War and Society {1994) 12:1;69. 
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Irish recruits and men of different religions to their 
own. 1177 An officer in another war-raised battalion, the 6th 
Leinsters, wrote: "as the war dragged on the dearth of Irish 
recruits led to an increasing dilution of the division (lOth 
Irish Division) by alien elements. 1178 For the Irish infantry 
regiments and especially the "Pals Battalions", it is true 
that an identity founded upon locality was 
susceptible to destruction. 1179 
"uniquely 
The year 1917 has been identified as the critical period 
of the war regarding British troop morale. 80 Wilson states 
that by December of 1917 there was general discontent in the 
trenches and "morale had sagged to the lowest levels of the 
war. n81 While he provides possible reasons for low morale 
such as bad weather and shaken confidence, it would be most 
instructive to examine what he terms the "apex of 
attrition." 82 For example, the strength of the 29th Division 
was reduced by fifty percent over the two days, 20-21 November 
77 Imperial War Museum (I.W.M.) 84/46/1 Capt.M.Hardie G.H.Q. 
Intelligence: Censor's Office Report on Morale. December 7, 1916. 
78N.Perry "Nationality in Irish Infantry Regiments" p.65. 
79Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.44. 
80B.Wilson, "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.212. See 
Also: !.Beckett "A Nation in Arms" in A Nation in Arms p.23. 
81wilson, "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.212. 
82wilson, "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.212. 
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1917, during the Battle of Cambrai. 83 If frequent and rapid 
changes in the personnel of a battalion are destructive to 
unit cohesion and good morale, then the "apex of attrition" 
must also signal the nadir of cohesion and morale. 
The attrition of 1917 cumulated with yet another crisis 
in manpower at the end of the year. As if the casualties of 
Arras, Passhendaele and Cambrai were not enough, the Germans 
had begun to reinforce their positions with divisions from the 
Eastern Front made available after the collapse of Russia. The 
British solution was to reorganize the composition of their 
tactical units following the example of French and German 
brigade organization. On January 10, 1918, the Army Council 
decided to reduce the number of battalions in a brigade from 
four to three. 84 This had the effect of maintaining the same 
number of divisions in the field with fewer men. As a result, 
141 battalions were disbanded and the men were used to fill 
the ranks of the more senior regiments which remained. 85 No 
"regular" battalions were disbanded so the units to be 
cannibalized were chosen from the New Army battalions and some 
selected territorial units. 86 
83Gillon, The Story of the 29th. Division p.175. 
84Wilson "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.265. 
85wilson, "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.266. 
86Moore, Thin Yellow Line p.131. 
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This reorganization had deleterious effects upon troop 
morale. Relationships between units were broken up which 
affected the morale of those units as well as the esprit de 
corps of the larger entity of the brigade or division. 87 One 
divisional historian remarked, that in divisions and brigades 
with strong territorial associations, "such changes could not 
be without their effect upon morale. 1188 For example, the 50th 
(Northumbrian) Division, a Territorial formation, was reduced 
to cadre strength after sustaining heavy casualties in the 
German offensive of March 1918. 89 By the time the Division 
was reconstituted in July 1918, not even one battalion of the 
original division remained. 90 The units of the newly reborn 
division had not served together and were going into the line 
with no esprit de corps and with little confidence in the 
other units' ability in battle. This great change in 
organization had dire effects upon morale at the brigade and 
divisional levels. 
At the personal level, the deleterious effect upon morale 
was no less great. The effect of turbulence on the individual 
87wilson, "Morale and Discipline in the B.E.F." p.266 . 
88c.Falls, The History of the 36th. (Ulster) Division (London: 
McCaw , Stevenson and Orr; 1922) p.184. 
89 I.Beckett, "The Territorial Force" A Nation in Arms p.147. 
90E.Wyrall The History of the 50th Division (London: Lund, 
Humphries;1939) p.353. 
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and his unit has been discussed previously and needs no 
retelling. It is reasonable to expect that a soldier would 
want to stay amongst friends where he felt that he belonged. 
Returning wounded particularly resented being 
sent to units where they were among strangers, in 
regiments with alien traditions and a different 
regional background. 91 
The damage to morale is illustrated by the experience of one 
soldier whose battalion was disbanded. Cpl. G.V. Dennis was a 
signaller in the 21st. King's Royal Rifle Corps, (The Yeoman 
Rifles) . His great attachment to his own unit was demonstrated 
when the Medical Officer asked him why, if he was ill, did he 
not report sick ? He replied "I did not want to leave the 
battalion. 1192 He was wounded and was in hospital when he 
learned that his unit had been disbanded and the survivors 
were sent to various other battalions of the regiment. 
Although he was a Yorkshireman, he was posted to the Cameron 
Highlanders in June, 1918. He bemoaned his lack of friends in 
the new unit and felt that his old unit was superior. He 
wrote: "My waterbottle disappeared. Such a loss would not have 
happened in the old Yeoman Rifles." 93 Cpl. Dennis' morale was 
91Moore, The Thin Yellow Line p.88. 
92 rmperial War Museum (I.W.M.) 78/58/1 G.V.Dennis (Memoir) 
93 r.W.M. 78/58/1 G.V.Dennis Memoir 
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directly affected by the company he kept and the unit in which 
he served. Like the establishment of the training reserves, 
the rationalization of the brigades might have improved 
logistical efficiency but it had a destructive effect on 
cohesion and morale. 
It has been the object of this chapter to demonstrate 
that the institution of the battalion changed over the course 
of the war because of the vast number of soldiers that would 
pass through the unit. By the summer of 1917, there was such 
a great turnover of personnel in any given battalion that the 
composition and character of the unit was completely different 
from when it began active service. Morton records that the 
average Canadian infantry battalion absorbed between 4, 500 and 
5, 500 men to maintain a fighting strength of about 1000 
soldiers. 94 The experience of the Newfoundland Regiment fits 
this pattern as 5046 men served overseas in an effort to keep 
just one battalion in the field. 95 The Regiment's War Diary 
records that on September 18, 1918, out of 841 officers and 
men, "fifty percent of the men had not been in action 
before." 96 The changes in personnel were dictated by the 
94D.Morton When Your Number's Up p.77. 
95stastics of the Militarv Effort Of the British Empire During 
the Great War (London: H.M.S.O.; 1922) p.776. See also: Sharpe, 
"Race of Honour" pp.34-35. Not all of the 5046 were combatants. 
96P.R.O. WO 95/1775 "War Diary, Royal Newfoundland Regiment, 
28th. Bde. 9th Div." Sept. 28, 1918. But all were Newfoundlanders 
74 
constant need for manpower caused by high casualties suffered 
at the front. Many battalions lost their distinctive 
identities or were disbanded altogether because the members of 
the original group were killed or wounded and their places 
were filled with strangers to the group. The Newfoundlanders 
maintained their distinctive identity because casualties in 
the battalion were replaced by men of the same unit, who 
called the same region home. 
The Regiment sustained heavy casualties in the Battle of 
the Lys in April 1918. Because it was under-strength and 
sufficient reinforcements were not forthcoming, the battalion 
was withdrawn from the 29th. Division and sent to General 
Headquarters at Etaple to rebuild. 97 This was the consequence 
of trying to maintain a homogeneous regional unit with a 
limited pool of reinforcements. Not surprisingly, the only 
other "regional" battalion in the Division, the Royal Guernsey 
Light Infantry, was also withdrawn. This was a Territorial 
battalion which had not seen action before joining the 
division in October of 1917. 98 That the Royal Guernsey Light 
Infantry lasted only five months at the front demonstrates the 
rate of attrition and the difficulty of keeping a battalion up 
to strength. Unlike the Newfoundlanders, the battalion from 
97Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander, p.460. 
98Gillon, The story of the 29th. Division p.147. and 196. 
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Guernsey was removed from the line permanently. 
By late 1916, the Cardwellian infantry battalion ceased 
to exist. Battle attrition and measures taken to keep units 
reinforced were to blame. To cope with the increasing manpower 
crisis, the Army sent men to where they were needed most, not 
to where they belonged. The men had no ties, loyalty or 
solidarity to the new unit or the other soldiers in the unit. 
In this way, infantry battalions were kept up to strength, but 
at the expense of unit cohesion and battalion morale. 
For the soldier, the effect of the battalion's demise 
was disastrous. Group and individual morale dropped because 
unit cohesion fell apart. Because men were entering and 
leaving the battalion as though through a revolving door, men 
experienced "turbulence" which is caused by a difficulty, or 
an inability to integrate into the group. Turbulence 
contributed to war neuroses such as "shell shock". 99 Without 
the community of the battalion, soldiers no longer 
experienced a sense of solidarity, identity or belonging. The 
group had lost its influence over the men and with it went the 
confidence and mutual support characteristic of a good 
battalion. The Army's reinforcement policies killed the 
Cardwellian battalion. Because the Army interfered with the 
traditional link between the soldier and his battalion, 
99copp and MacAndrew, Battle Exhaustion p.100. and Ahrenfeldt, 
Psychiatry in the British Army p.215. 
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cohesion and morale suffered. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT 
The distinctive characteristic of the Newfoundland 
Regiment was its strong national identity. The sense of 
community in this battalion was stronger than in other British 
units because for the men, it represented a connection with 
home in an otherwise unfamiliar and hostile environment. The 
battalion's role as a home away from home was familiar to 
soldiers of the Regular Army who had served in the far-flung 
garrisons of the Empire. 1 In these outposts of Empire, far 
from home and in an alien environment, the battalion was the 
focus of social events and welfare measures for the troops. 
The promotion of the battalion's role as a surrogate family 
was common practise in the pre-war army. As the institution of 
the battalion diminished during the war because of attrition , 
its function as the social focus of the men's life 
disappeared. As the war progressed, the battalion 
characterized as a close knit community became more the 
exception than the rule. 
The cornerstone of the Newfoundlanders' morale was the 
strong national identity of the battal i on. Field-Marshal 
Montgomery recognized this kind of relationship which existed 
1Weston, "The Army: Mother, Sister and Mistress: The British 
Regiment" p.142. and Baynes, Morale pp.32-4. 
between the soldier and the society from which he comes. 
The soldier is not chiefly a military figure, he 
is primarily a social figure. He is influenced by 
his home, his upbringing and historical tradition. 
The national character is therefore of immense 
importance. 2 
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Fuller demonstrated that this "national character" was a 
factor in the strong cohesion of Australian units. He suggests 
that the bonds amongst the group were magnified by the 
distance from Australia both geographically and temporally. 3 
R. D. Mitchell described it this way: "Long separation from 
Australia cut us away from the land of our birth ... our only 
home was our unit." 4 Fuller concluded that such loyalties 
were unknown in the British units. 5 such loyalties 
demonstrated proof of the presence and degree of cohesion in 
the unit. 
Like the Australians, the Newfoundlanders were also far 
from home and dependent on the community of the battalion for 
a "surrogate family". w.c. Hawker, a ranker in the 
Newfoundland Regiment, described how unit cohesion was created 
by serving overseas with the regiment. 
Distance and the trials of camp and field, the 
2B.L.Montgomery, "Morale in Battle" British Medical Journal 
(Nov. 09, 1946) p.702. 
3Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.23. 
4R.D. Mitchell, Backs to the Wall (Sydney, 1937) p.168. 
5Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.23. 
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common hardships and privations knit one and all in 
close comradeship, and national prejudices melted 
forever in the warmth of the Brotherhood of Service. 6 
It may be accepted that, for the Newfoundlanders, serving 
overseas drew the battalion closer together as a community and 
thus strengthened cohesion. The soldiers held two things in 
common which served to unify the battalion: continuity and 
homogeneity. It was not only the shared experience of "common 
hardships and privations" but they also shared a common place 
of origin. More than ninety percent of the men came from the 
one small colony. 7 As much as they could identify with the 
unit, the men could equally identify with their comrades. As 
long as they remained with the same battalion, then they could 
consider themselves at home. St!ong identity in the battalion 
was an indicator of good cohesion and a contributor to high 
morale. A Newfoundlander described the influence of the 
national character on the regiment as a builder of esprit: 
Esprit de corps, as is well known, is the spirit 
which inspires the training of the British Army and 
in the case of our regiment the spirit was deepened 
by national consciousness. 8 
6w.c.Hawker, "Some Characteristics and Traditions of the Royal 
Newfoundland Regiment" The Veteran {April 1928) 7:1:48. 
7 P.A.N.L. MG 632/23 "Reports of the Patriotic Association" 
Recruitment Committee, Annual Report 1916. By years end, of 3288 
recruits, only 50 (1.5%) listed home towns outside Newfoundland. 
8w.c.Hawker "Some Characteristics and Traditions of the Royal 
Newfoundland Regiment" The Veteran {April 1928) 7:1;47. 
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That the Newfoundland Regiment maintained its identity 
throughout the war is neither accidental, nor the function of 
luck. It was the product of a deliberate and active campaign 
on the part of the regimental administration at home. It has 
been suggested that "no other unit in the British Army had 
such a degree of personal interest concentrated upon it. " 9 
This came from both official and civilian agencies. Until 1917 
the body responsible for the administration of the regiment 
was The Patriotic Association of Newfoundland. With the 
establishment of the coalition government in 1917, these 
duties were assumed by the newly formed Department of Militia. 
The Patriotic Association was an apolitical, nondemoninational 
body composed of more than fifty leading figures from 
Newfoundland's political, mercantile and social life. Chaired 
by Governor Sir Walter E. Davidson, the committee claimed to 
have the kind of popular support that no government could 
enjoy as it was non-sectarian and non-partisan. 10 Thus, with 
a relatively powerful lobby working on its behalf, the first 
five hundred of the Newfoundland contingent sailed for England 
to come to the aid of the motherland in the great European 
9 p. R. o'Brien, "The Newfoundland Patriotic Association" p. 179. 
10c.o. 194 /288 Letter: Davidson to Harcourt Sept 07, 1914 
Dispatch #155 Comments on the "Volunteer Force Act". See Also: 
Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.l03. 
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war . 11 
The Newfoundlanders were confident about their identity 
as a national military force but seemingly few could 
distinguish them from the Canadians. However, this may have 
worked to further unify the Newfoundlanders. According to the 
historian, E.J.Hobsbawm, "There is no more effective way of 
bonding together peoples other than to unite them against 
outsiders. 1112 They were first mistaken for Canadians even 
as they were heading overseas on the s .s .Florizel. On October 
12, 1914, Owen Steele recorded in his diary that another ship 
in the convoy passed by and was greeted by three cheers. 
her band responded with the new Canadian 
Anthem evidentially putting us down for Canadians. 
We responded with "Britannia Rules the Waves 11 . 13 
On the 14th, the Florizel docked at Devenport. One private 
remembered that to welcome the Newfoundlanders, the band 
played "Oh Canada" . 14 Upon arriving in the United Kingdom, 
111 use the qualifier "relatively" to describe powerful as it 
will be shown that when the Patriotic Association conflicted with 
the Army, the Army usually won. 
12E.J.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1990) p.91. 
13centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives (C.N.S.) Memorial 
University of Newfoundland. Call - 179 Diary of the Late Owen 
Steele. October 10, 1914. 
14A.J. Stacey "The Memoirs of A.J. Stacey: A Newfoundlander at 
War" (Unpublished MSS memoir) C.N.S., M.U.N. p.S. 
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Frank Lind complained that "Everywhere in England we were 
taken as Canadians .... " and expressed the opinion that "They 
[the English] did not seem to know that Newfoundland is not 
Canada. 1115 As if it was not enough to be mistaken for 
Canadians by the English, the Newfoundlanders found their 
identity threatened even more when they were sent to a 
Canadian encampment at Salisbury Plain. 
At Pond Farm Camp, the 540 men of the Newfoundland 
Regiment were attached to a Canadian Brigade and put under the 
command of a Canadian officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
1 16 E.B.C egg. owen Steele, then a Sargent, wrote to his 
parents: 
To 
We are all very particular here that we should 
not be classed as Canadians ... we are much prouder 
of our distinction as Newfoundlanders .... 17 
make matters worse, it was suggested that the 
Newfoundlanders should amalgamate with a half battalion from 
Nova Scotia also camped at Salisbury Plain. 18 If they were 
amalgamated, the contingent would "lose its name and 
individuality" and it was reported that, "the feeling of the 
15Frank Lind, The Letters of Mayo Lind p.23. 
16Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.123. 
17c.N.S. Coll - 179 "Diary of the Late owen Steele" Letter to 
his parents, December 02, 1914. 
1811The Blue Puttees" The Veteran (Dec. 1921) 1:4;14. 
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Blue Puttees against the suggestion was very strong. " 19 
Steele noted, "our officers are very strongly opposed to any 
such intention." All fears were allayed on December 3 when it 
was announced that the Newfoundlanders were to move to Fort 
George, Invernesshire, far away from any Canadians. The 
Canadian Commander at Salisbury Plain informed the 
Newfoundlanders that they were to be moved because they were 
to be brought up to battalion strength, a decision, he said, 
which would preserve the contingent's identity. 20 More 
recruits came from Newfoundland and with the battalion up to 
strength (about 1000 men), they established their depot in Ayr 
and began training in earnest. 
Having escaped annexation to the Canadians, the 
Newfoundland battalion maintained its individuality and was 
sent to the Dardanelles in August of 1915 as part of the 29th 
Division. The next threat to the integrity of a battalion was 
the faceless reinforcement policy as manifested by the 
"training reserve battalions" in September 1916. This policy 
has been discussed in detail earlier in this study. It is 
sufficient to say that the redirection of men to the "training 
reserve battalions" was one of the major causes leading to the 
19
"The Blue Puttees" The Veteran (Dec. 1921) 1:4;14. 
20c.N.S. Cell - 179 "Diary of the Late Owen Steele" Letter to 
his Parents, Dec. 03, 1914. The commander was premature in his 
announcement as the Government had not yet decided to raise a full 
battalion. Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.127. 
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end of distinctive battalions and the disintegration of the 
regimental system. 
The Newfoundlanders did not suffer from the dilution of 
their battalion with outsiders. One of the reasons for this 
was their immunity from the rest of the army's reinforcement 
system. It is true that while reinforcements for British 
battalions might come from any regiment, colonial contingents 
were privileged by having only national reinforcements. 21 If 
a Canadian was wounded, he would return to a Canadian unit but 
probably not the same battalion he left at the front. 22 
Similarly, wounded Australians would be returned to an 
Australian Division, but had no guarantee that they would be 
returned to their old unit. 23 It could be argued that the 
Newfoundlanders came under the classification of "colonial 
troops". Technically, they were the national contingent and 
were, like the Canadians, entitled to have only national 
reinforcements. It must be remembered that the Newfoundlanders 
were not part of a colonial contingent, they belonged to a 
21winter, neath's Men p.42. 
22Morton, When Your Number's Up p.77. 
23c.E.W Bean The Official History of Australia In the War of 
1914-18 Vol.III. (St.Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland 
Press; 1981) pp.177-179. 
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regular army division of the British infantry. 24 If the 
Newfoundland Regiment, like the regionally-based "Pals 
battalions", could not maintain sufficient numbers to keep up 
to strength, they too would be disbanded. Indeed, the regiment 
was pulled out of the line in April 1918 because it was under 
strength. The options given to the Newfoundland Government 
were either to find reinforcements or have the battalion 
disbanded. 25 Newfoundland's contingent was not protected 
solely because of its colonial status in this regard. Rather, 
the unit kept its identity because of the way it functioned 
within the British Army: as a Cardwellian battalion would 
function under ideal circumstances. 
The Newfoundland Regiment • s depot was important for 
fostering regimental identity. This is an administrative 
detail, but it was important for creating cohesion. The 
maintenance of a depot was an advantage that the British 
battalions did not have after 1916. There, men convalesced 
from hospitalization and new recruits from Newfoundland would 
train and become integrated with the other members of the 
24Journal of the House of Assembly 1914 "An Act Respecting a 
Volunteer Force in this Colony" " [The Force] ... may be put under the 
command of his Majesty's Army." 
25Rev.T.Nangle, The Trail of the Caribou (St.John's:Daily 
Star;1918) Lecture published as a pamphlet. A recruiting appeal 
appears on the page following the lecture. 
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regiment. 26 Men and officers returning from instruction or 
hospital would return to the front via the depot thus 
providing a sense of continuity within the regiment. A veteran 
of the Newfoundland Regiment explained how continuity was 
maintained within the battalion: 
Close association with the "old hands" .... was 
largely responsible for this [esprit] and as the war 
lengthened, the new hands became the old and the 
traditions grew with the regimental doings. 27 
Reinforcement drafts for the battalion at the front would be 
sent only from this depot, and would be composed only of men 
of the Newfoundland regiment. 28 The turnover of personnel 
grew proportionately with the increasingly high rate of 
casualties. The new recruits would be unfamiliar faces to the 
"old hands" at the front but at least they were 
Newfoundlanders. These reinforcements had enough in common 
with the rest of the soldiers in the battalion to integrate 
successfully into the unit and feel that they belonged to the 
community. The Newfoundland Regiment's control over its own 
reinforcements proved to be a significant factor in preserving 
continuity and homogeneity within the unit and thereby 
26Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander, p.215. 
27w.c.Hawker "Some Characteristics and Traditions of the 
Newfoundland Regiment" in The Veteran (1928) 7:1;47 
28Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.285.,320 . & 440. 
Also: Gallishaw Trenching at Gallipoli p. 148. and The 
Correspondence of Capt.L.S.Woods, Royal Newfoundland Regiment 1911-
1921. (Private Collection). 
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maintaining unit cohesion. 
As mentioned, even when the Newfoundlanders were wounded, 
they could be sure that they would be returned to their old 
regiment. If their wounds were serious enough to send them 
back to Britain, they would be accommodated in the same 
hospital. Dr.Cluny MacPherson, a St.John's physician and later 
Royal Army Medical Corps Officer, made arrangements with the 
senior British Medical officer, Sir Alfred Keogh to see that 
this would be done. 29 The regimental history records "that 
as far as possible, wounded Newfoundlanders in the United 
Kingdom would be concentrated in the 3rd. London General 
Hospital at Wandsworth. " 30 Indeed, the Newfoundlanders were 
privileged in this respect. Even when the War Office converted 
Wandsworth into an Officers' Hospital, a section of the 
facility was reserved for Newfoundlanders of all ranks. 31 
Prime Minister Sir Edward Morris visited the more than three 
hundred wounded Newfoundlanders at this hospital some six 
weeks after the Battle of Beaumont-Hamel. 32 In late 1917, 
Lieut. Lloyd Woods was hospitalized there with another officer 
29colonial Office (C.O.) 194 /289. Letter: Lord Islington to 
Sir Alfred Keogh., April 12, 1915. Also: P.A.N.L. MG 632/17 
Newfoundland War Contingent Association Memo: "Visiting and 
provisions for the sick and the wounded" November 1915. 
30Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.224. 
31
"A Friend and Admirer of Ours" The Veteran (1922) 2:1;65. 
32Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.290. 
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of the Newfoundland Regiment, Lieut. Fred Rendell. 33 The 
comfort of being with friends and familiar faces, especially 
during something as unpleasant as hospitalization, cannot be 
underestimated. Cpl. Ralph Shears recalled that when he was 
wounded for the second time, "I was disappointed when I knew 
that I was not going back to Wandsworth." 34 
The Newfoundlanders did not suffer the dilution of their 
ranks with alien reinforcements as did other locally recruited 
battalions. The survival of the battalion in this respect is 
due partly to the to the privileged position the regiment held 
as a colonial contingent and partly due to the administration 
of the regimental system. Unlike the situation of the British 
regiments, it was advantageous for the war effort in 
Newfoundland for the regiment to keep its national 
identity. 35 This political or propagandist end was not 
fulfilled to the detriment of military efficiency. In April 
1918, the Newfoundland Regiment was removed from the front 
because they were under-strength and unable to discharge their 
assigned duties. 
The degree to which this protection was a function of the 
33woods' Correspondence: November 2, 1917. 
34Interview, R.C.Shears (Interviewed by the author) May 20 
1990. 
35P.R. O'Brien "The Newfoundland Patriotic Association" "The 
population maintained the regiment out of pride." p.335. 
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Newfoundland Government or of the British Army is unclear. It 
is difficult to ascertain who had the final say. The 
regimental historian records that even as early as 1914, the 
regiment's Commanding Officer, Lt.Col. H. de R. Burton, was 
servant of two masters. On the one hand, he was answerable to 
the General Officer Commanding, Scottish Command. On the other 
hand, Lt. Col. Burton had to report to Governor Sir Walter 
Davidson who was Colonel in Chief of the regiment as well as 
chairman of the Newfoundland Patriotic Association. 36 
Similarly, Lt.Col. C.W. Whitaker, Commanding Officer of the 
2nd Reserve Battalion, was caught in a bind over the unpopular 
removal of the reserve Battalion from Ayr to Barry in 1917. 37 
When he represented the position of the Government of 
Newfoundland against the move, he incurred the displeasure of 
his superiors in Scottish Command. Governor Davidson cabled 
the Colonial Office expressing his "great dissatisfaction" 
over the move of the reserve battalion. 38 The Army moved the 
battalion and seemingly ignored the wishes of the Governor of 
Newfoundland, the chairman of the Patriotic Association and 
the Colonel of the regiment. The influence of the regimental 
organization in Newfoundland was limited. While the leaders in 
36Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.132. 
37Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.374. 
38P.A.N.L. MG 632/22d Telegram: Davidson to Long, Colonial 
Office. July 03, 1917. 
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St.John's did what they could to influence the fate of their 
battalion, it is clear that military expedients took 
precedence over the desires of the colonial government. 
The continued existence of the Newfoundland Regiment in 
France was important for the war effort in Newfoundland. It 
was said that the regiment "symbolized the colony's identity" 
and "instilled ... a truly national purpose." 39 On occasion 
Governor Sir Walter Davidson threatened the Colonial Office 
with the spectre of voluntary recruitment drying up if the 
regiment was not handled as the Patriotic Committee saw 
fit. 40 It is not clear how well or how often this kind of 
"blackmail" worked. In September 1917, Davidson appealed to 
have the regiment granted the title "Royal" but was 
refused. 41 In this case, Field Marshal Haig's thinly veiled 
appeal for recruits seemed to changed the mind of the Army 
Council. On December 7, 1917, Haig wrote: 
I hope the colony will keep this splendid regiment 
up to full establishment and speedily send the men 
required to replace those who have given their lives. 
39o•arien, "The Newfoundland Patriotic Association" p.335. 
40Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.371. Also: P.A.N.L. 
MG 632/ 22c "Governor's Correspondence" Cable Feb. 1, 1916. Re. 
Raising a second battalion. MG 632/ 22d Cable July 3, 1917 Re . 
Moving depot to Barry. and P.R.O. WO 32/5012 Correspondence re. 
granting the title "Royal" to the regiment. 
41c.o. 194 /293 Cable: Sept. 3, 1917 Davidson to Long. Also: 
P.R.O. WO 32/5012 "Application for the title Royal to be granted to 
the Newfoundland Regiment" 
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... hope that vacancies will be filled at once ... . 42 
The following day Sir Herbert Creedy of the War Office wrote 
to Buckingham Palace with a request and suggested that the 
effect of granting the honour might "stimulate the 
[Newfoundland] Government to fresh efforts in the matter of 
recruiting." 43 On December lOth, the title "Royal" was 
granted to the Newfoundland Regiment. In this affair, the 
combination of recruitment politics and help from friends in 
high places changed army policy and brought about the desired 
effect. 44 
It is significant that the Newfoundland Regiment survived 
intact when the brigades were rationalized from four to three 
battalions in February 1918. From each brigade, one battalion 
was either broken up and the men used to reinforce other 
units, or a battalion was moved to replace other disbanded 
units. It would be instructive to examine the fate of the 
other battalions in the 29th Division at that time. In the 
86th. Brigade, another war-raised unit, the 16th. Middlesex 
Regiment, was disbanded and its members were dispersed. The 
42P.R.O. WO 32/5012 "Application" Cable: Dec. 7, 1917, Haig to 
War Office. 
43 I P.R.O. WO 32 5012 "Application" Letter: Dec. 8, 1917: 
Creedy to Lord Stanfordham. 
44 P.R.O. WO 32/5012. "Application" The help was undoubtedly 
solicited help. Haig states in his Dec. 7 telegram that he was in 
communication with Davidson who was then in France. 
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1st. Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 87th. Brigade, a regular 
unit, was moved to the 36th. (Ulster) Division to replace a 
disbanded Irish battalion. In the Newfoundlanders' brigade, 
the 88th, the 1st. Essex Regiment was moved to replace a 
disbanded battalion. 45 The blow to morale was twofold. Old 
comrades left the brigade, and except for the Royal 
Newfoundland Regiment, the remaining battalions were 
reinforced with the men from any number of disbanded units. 
That the Newfoundlanders were not disbanded at this time 
demonstrates the case for military efficiency over political 
meddling or national sentiment. As late as February 1918, the 
Royal Newfoundland Regiment was a viable force and was still 
acting as a traditional British regiment. 
By September, 1918, the Newfoundland Battalion was back 
up to strength and was sent to join the 9th (Scottish) 
Division. Ironically, the Newfoundlanders replaced another 
colonial contingent, the South Africans. The South African 
experience also demonstrates the effects of attrition. Four 
infantry battalions made up the 28th. Brigade as a national 
formation in early 1916. By April 1918, the South African 
contingent was so weakened that of the entire brigade, there 
was only enough men to form one composite battalion. 46 
45Gillon, The Story of the 29th Division p.256. 
46Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander p.476. 
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The example of the South African Brigade shows the 
effects of attrition and the difficulty of maintaining a 
"national" force. The Newfoundland Regiment was subject to the 
same conditions as other battalions of the .British Army yet it 
preserved its distinctive identity where other units could 
not. This anomaly was made possible because the Newfoundland 
battalion was organized and administered as a traditional 
British regiment. When traditional means of administration and 
reinforcement fell victim to the exigencies of war, 
regionally-based battalions became diluted with recruits from 
other units. Because the Newfoundlanders were nominally under 
the control of the Newfoundland Government, they enjoyed a 
degree of protection from the Army Council's decrees that 
effectively destroyed the individual nature of the traditional 
battalion. 
National identity in the Newfoundland Regiment was 
important for the men of the battalion and for the war effort 
at home. For the soldiers, it was an essential element in unit 
cohesion and a contributor to high morale. On the homefront it 
provided a focus for voluntary recruitment drives as well as 
fund raising campaigns. National identity was promoted by two 
distinct but complementary entities. First, within the 
traditional "Cardwellian" regimental system, battalion 
organization served to foster unit identity which, in this 
case, was Newfoundland's national identity. Second, the 
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regiment's status as a colonial contingent preserved that 
identity by protecting the battalion from the Army's 
centralized reinforcement policies and by occasionally 
bringing political pressure to bear upon the War Office . 
National identity was promoted because it made for a cohesive 
unit and it benefitted the war effort at home. As will be 
demonstrated, national identity is inextricably linked to the 
efforts to promote cohesion and morale in the Newfoundland 
Regiment. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DELIVERY OF MORALE 
The 1922 Report on Shell Shock advised that "Morale can 
be, and has to be, created." 1 This chapter will demonstrate 
how morale was created and how it worked within the regimental 
structure. It will examine some of the specific measures taken 
to promote and maintain morale in the Royal Newfoundland 
Regiment. In particular, this chapter is concerned with the 
efforts in Newfoundland to provide the troops with some of the 
comforts of home as well as the initiatives for entertainment 
which came from within the battalion. In previous chapters the 
preconditions and facilitators of morale were studied. It was 
established that the regimental system was the best vehicle 
for the promotion of morale. This chapter will examine how 
morale was introduced to the unit and how it functioned within 
this dynamic. 
Within the Newfoundland Regiment efforts to promote 
morale came from two sources: the battalion in the field and 
civilian agencies on the home front. At the front, the 
battalion organized sporting events, concerts and other 
entertainments about which more will be said later. There can 
be no doubt as to the necessity for these recreations and 
1Report on Shell Shock (1922) p.208. 
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"distractions". The author of a recent study on the 
relationship of popular culture to troop morale suggested 
that: "It was precisely because the war was so terrible, so 
hideous a reality after the civilians' dreams of glory that 
men, to survive, had periodically to escape." 2 
On the home front, the civilian population contributed to 
the general welfare and comfort of their soldiers (sailors, 
airmen and nurses3 ) in the form of voluntary societies which 
raised money and sent packages to the troops. Seemingly simple 
items such as Newfoundland cigarettes, newspapers, knitted 
goods and culinary treats lifted the men's spirits. The 
"comforts", as they were known, performed three necessary 
functions. First and foremost, they addressed the soldier's 
personal comfort and happiness. Second, they provided the 
vital link with the man's home and a connection to a place 
where there was no war. Third, the packages from Newfoundland 
were tangible demonstrations to the men that the people at 
home had not forgotten about them. In this way, civilians 
participated in the war effort and felt that they were "doing 
their bit". More importantly, this strengthened the bond 
between the regiment and the community. This moral and 
material support came from two agencies: the Women's Patriotic 
2Fuller Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.176. 
3The Journal of the House of Assembly 1919 (Appendix) 
"The Report of the War Contingent Association." pp.593-608. 
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Association (W. P. A. ) and the Newfoundland War Contingent 
Association. 
The Women's Patriotic Association was founded in 
St.John's at the end of August 1914 by the Governor's wife , 
Lady Margaret Davidson. 4 Its purpose was to produce comforts 
for the troops such as shirts and socks and "Red Cross Work", 
which included bandages and dressings. It became the outward 
demonstration of patriotism for the women of Newfoundland. 
This quickly became a popular body with 183 branches and over 
seven thousand members across the country in the first year of 
operation. 5 
The case of the W.P.A. demonstrates the degree and extent 
of the community's interest in the soldiers' welfare. Branches 
were established in many of the smaller communities and were 
usually organised by the clergyman's wife or other leading 
ladies of the community. Branches were set up along the lines 
of the British "Queen Mary's Needlework Guild". Like a cottage 
industry, the guild distributed materials to the membership 
who would then turn out finished pieces for distribution by 
4 See: P.A.N.L. MG 635/1 Women's Patriotic Association Minutes 
1914-21. The Daily News September 01, 1914. and Patriotic 
Association of the Women of Newfoundland Annual Report 1916 (C.N.S. 
Memorial University of Newfoundland) and B.Doran "Women's War 
Efforts" (Unpublished MSS, C.N.S. 1988} p.1. 
5o•Brien, "The Patriotic Association" p.53. 
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the central authority. 6 Often, the membership of the W.P.A. 
followed existing women's social organizations such as church 
groups and fraternal groups.In St.John's there were branches 
representing The Presbyterian Hall and its affiliate, the 
Young Ladies' Guild of St.Andrew's, as well as the women's 
associations of the Anglican Cathedral, St.Thomas•s and 
St.Mary•s. 7 There is no reason to suggest that this was not 
also the pattern outside of St.John's. Riding on the back of 
the network of existing women's organizations, the w. P. A. 
spread quickly and extensively throughout the country. 
There was a kind of universality of support not enjoyed 
by any other wartime institution in Newfoundland. Even in 
communi ties hostile to the recruitment efforts, the recruiting 
parties reported meeting "a dedicated group of women working 
long through the winter nights in the remote settlements , 
often the only sign that a war was in progress."8 The women 
of the Newfoundland, indeed the whole population, were 
concerned for the welfare and comfort of their representatives 
in the war. The Newfoundland Regiment was fortunate that it 
had such close ties with the community. Moreover, since they 
were the only military force from the island, they received 
6 P.A.N.L. MG 635/1 The W.P.A. Records. Minute Book, 1914-16. 
7c.N.S. W.P.A. Annual Report 1916 November 16, 1916. p.6. 
8o•Brien, The Newfoundland Patriotic Association" p.53. 
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the undivided attention of its population. 9 O'Brien suggests 
that "no other unit in the British Army had such a degree of 
personal interest concentrated upon it."10 They enjoyed such 
attention and interest because they were the only identifiable 
representatives of the people of Newfoundland in the War. The 
W.P.A. was one example, but a very important example, of the 
"personal interest" expressed in the regiment. 
By June of 1918, the W.P.A. had produced roughly thirty 
thousand pairs of socks, fifteen thousand shirts and some 
sixty-five thousand pairs of mittens. Further to this, they 
raised well over three hundred thousand dollars for various 
causes including refugee relief, the Red Cross, Ambulances, 
and a fund for Fish and Brewis (a traditional fish dish) for 
the Newfoundland Troops. 11 The primary focus of the W.P.A. 
was that of the comfort and welfare of Newfoundland's soldiers 
and sailors both at home and overseas. At home the men were 
accessible in barracks training, or in hospital convalescing 
in St.John's. Overseas, the W.P.A. needed the help of another 
agency to distribute the packages designated for the 
Newfoundlanders. In this way the War Contingent Association 
9 The men of the Royal Naval Reserve often felt forgotten or 
ignored eventhough they were cared for by the W.P.A. 
10o•Brien, "The Newfoundland Patriotic Association" p.179. 
11Journal of the House of Assembly 1917 (Appendix) pp.343-345. 
Journal of the House of Assembly 1919 (Appendix) p. 588. and 
Nicholson, Fighting Newfoundlander pp.224-226. 
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complemented the work of the W.P.A. 
The Newfoundland War Contingent Association was created 
in London in September 1915 by a number of prominent citizens 
who were either Newfoundlanders or who had Newfoundland 
connections. The founding members included Sir Edgar Bowring 
of the St.John's mercantile family, Sir William MacGregor, a 
former Governor of the Colony, and Sir Arthur Steele-Maitland 
M.p. I the Undersecretary for the Colonies. 12 It is 
significant that when this body was first proposed in January 
of 1915, the plan was to appoint a subcommittee to the 
Dominions War Contingents Advisory Committee. 13 It was later 
decided that hospital visits and the distribution of comforts 
would best be effected by a Newfoundland operated organization 
which existed solely and specifically for Newfoundland's men 
in uniform. 
Its mission was to "promote in every way possible the 
welfare and comfort of soldiers in the contingent. " 14 It 
fulfilled this objective in three ways: comforts for men on 
service, for the sick and the wounded and for the prisoners of 
war. In a report given at the end of the war, the War 
12Journal of the House of Assembly 1919 (Appendix) p.608. 
13P.A.N.L. MG 632/17 Records of the Newfoundland Patriotic 
Association. Meeting of 22 January, 1915. 
14P.A.N.L. MG 439 Capt. Leo c. Murphy Papers "Newfoundland War 
Contingent Association Articles of Association" 
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Contingent Association stated that it existed "so that 
Newfoundland boys may feel that there are friends in this 
country as anxious for their welfare as their own relatives on 
the island." 15 
Again, this promoted morale in three ways. It provided 
the means to improve the soldier's creature comforts, it 
provided yet another link with home and it showed that the 
people at home cared. This reinforced the soldier's identity 
with his community and strengthened his sense of belonging to 
his unit. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
national identity in the Newfoundland Regiment was not merely 
a matter of patriotism, but an important influence upon unit 
cohesion. Without a doubt, the soldiers' "welfare and comfort" 
was critical to morale. 
The first duty of the War Contingent Association was 
to distribute the work of the W.P.A. and other small luxuries 
to the men. As one would expect, the troops were enthusiastic 
in their praise of the comforts. The comments, however, say as 
much about the nostalgic effect of the parcels as they did 
about the physical luxuries of socks or a sweater. While 
home on leave in 1916, Lt. Gerald Harvey was asked about the 
value of comforts to the troops. He replied "I think that from 
a sentimental point of view and perhaps from the point of view 
15Journal of the House of Assembly 1919 Appendix p.597. 
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of necessity it is advisable to have these comforts sent." 16 
From Gallipoli, Frank Lind remarked "Chocolates and Cakes are 
very much appreciated Sweetmeats taste so much better 
under the conditions than they would at home." 17 Later on he 
thanks "the W.P.A. and the good people at home" and continues; 
"There is no sock like the Newfoundland home-made sock. nlB 
Great interest was expressed in the men's welfare by those on 
the home front. Indeed, a commission was struck to investigate 
claims that, amongst other things, the W.P.A. comforts were 
not reaching the men. 19 The packages from Newfoundland 
addressed some of the soldier's physical needs and reinforced 
his sense of identity with the community and the unit. The 
comforts and the men's response to them demonstrate the 
essential link between the soldier and the society from which 
he comes. 
The second duty of the War Contingent Association was 
that of visiting the men in hospitals. An early directive 
instructed that "visitors are to see that the men want for 
16P.A.N.L. MG 632/2.d. Reports of the Newfoundland Patriotic 
Association (Joint Committee to Enquire into Certain allegations 
regarding Food, Clothing, Pay and Comforts) Hereafter 
"Deficiencies Enquiry" p.16. 
17Lind, The Letters of Mayo-Lind p.l9. 
18Lind, The Letters of Mayo-Lind p.l35. 
19P.A.N.L. MG 632f2.d. Records of the Newfoundland Patriotic 
Association (Deficiencies enquiry) 
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nothing. 1120 Sargent Norman MacLeod was wounded at Gallipoli 
and was invalided back to England. The day after he arrived in 
an English hospital he wrote in his diary: "Visiting day. 
Members of Nfld War Contingent Assoc. came. Met Miss Hayward, 
an old friend of Miss Butler."21 The visitors also provided 
the men with a toiletry bag complete with razor, soap, 
toothbrush etc. 22 
Another responsibility of the hospital visitor was to 
write the soldier's family to report on his condition. Lloyd 
Woods' father received a letter from the War Contingent 
Association informing him that his son would be visited by 
someone who "will see that he is supplied with everything 
necessary for his comfort. 1123 A second letter soon followed 
from the association's visitor for Bristol area Hospitals, a 
Miss Arnaud. She had lived in St. John's and said that she "had 
something in common with the Newfoundland boys. 1124 To Lloyd's 
20P.A.N.L. MG 632/17 Reports of the Newfoundland Patriotic 
Association (War Contingent Association) 
21Norman A. MacLeod Diary (April 19, 1916) (Collection of 
W.D.Parsons, St.John's) 
22P.A.N.L. MG 632/17 Reports of the N.P.A. (War Contingent 
Association) Annual Report 1918. and Journal of the House of 
Assembly 1919 (Appendix) p.599. 
23woods Correspondence. Letter, Newfoundland War Contingent 
Association, London, to Mr.S.Woods, St.John's. October 27, 1915. 
24woods Correspondence. Letter, Miss Annette Arnaud to 
Mr.S.Woods. October 30, 1915. 
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father she wrote: "He seemed to be bright and cheerful and 
pleased to have a visit from someone so closely allied to his 
own hometown. 1125 Woods was appreciative of the attention and 
later wrote home to say that he had received a card and 
tobacco pouch from "the Nfld Association in London. " 26 At 
the organization's final meeting in 1919, it was boasted that 
"upwards of three thousand men had passed under our personal 
care in hospitals in this country. 1127 
The War Contingent Association was strictly a civilian 
enterprise and the hospital visitations did not directly 
influence troop morale at the front. It was, however, an 
important element in maintaining morale in the regiment. 
Earlier, the regiment was compared to a close-knit family. 28 
In the Newfoundlanders' case this was amplified by the 
distance from their home and loved ones. The War Contingent 
Association functioned as an extended family for the men of 
the regiment. In the same way the comforts promoted morale, 
the hospital visitors attended to creature comforts, and 
25woods Correspondence. Letter, Miss Annette Arnaud to 
Mr . S.Woods October 30, 1915. 
26woods Correspondence. Letter to Parents December 22, 1915. 
27P.A.N.L. MG 632/17 Reports of the N.P.A. (War Contingent 
Association) Meeting of October 31, 1919. Elsewhere the figure is 
given as 2600. Journal of the House of Assembly 1919 (Appendix) 
p.601. 
28Fuller. Troop Morale p.23. 
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represented Newfoundland at a time when the soldier was far 
from home and separated from the "family" of the battalion. 
Ideally, wherever the soldier was, he was in touch with one of 
the elements that supported morale be it his battalion , his 
community or his nation. 
The War Contingent Association had greater difficulty 
attending to the third group in its mandate, prisoners of war. 
The War Contingent Association endeavoured to keep track of 
each of the 179 men of the Newfoundland Regiment who were 
taken prisoner during the war. Once the prisoner was located , 
the association directed the parcels of food to him from the 
various relief organizations such as the Red Cross. 29 The 
only contact permitted under the German regulations was 
through officially sanctioned agencies such as the Red Cross 
and the British and Foreign Sailors' Society. 30 The War 
Contingent Association could fill only an administrative 
function with regard to the prisoners of war. 
The battalion at the front was the other source of 
morale. All the parcels from home would mean very little if 
high morale was not maintained at the battalion level. Steps 
were taken within the regiment to make life more bearable for 
the ordinary infantryman. To this end, sports, concert parties 
29Nicholson, Fighting Newfoundlander p.226. and pp.363-4. 
30Journal of the House of Assembly 1919 (Appendix) p.602 . 
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and canteens were organized for when the men were at rest . 
With respect to troop welfare in France, the 
Newfoundlanders benefited from the experience of the more 
senior units with whom they served. The Newfoundlanders were 
fortunate in that they belonged to a regular army division . 
Because the regular army battalions had been stationed in 
various far-flung parts of the Empire, they were able to 
operate as self-contained, self sufficient units. They were 
used to adapting to an alien environment and provided for the 
needs of the soldier within the community of the battalion. In 
the First World War, the regular divisions took the lead in 
organizing concerts, sports events and canteens. 31 The 
Newfoundland Regiment was then in the unusual position, for a 
war-raised unit, of stepping into a well organized division 
experienced in providing for the welfare of its troops. While 
the opportunity for entertainment could be provided by the 
division, the degree of success depended upon the 
participating battalion. The Newfoundlanders' experience 
demonstrates how such a distraction as sport benefited morale. 
Sport served not only to relieve boredom, but also to 
bolster battalion esprit de corps. 32 In early 1918, a report 
on morale made by the chief postal censor recognized that: 
31Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.57. 
32Fuller Troop Morale and Popular Culture p.90. 
Relaxation and sport of every kind tend to promote 
cheerfulness and good spirits: and are of immense 
value in maintaininJ the morale of the army at its 
present high level. 3 
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Although the record shows the Newfoundlanders were less than 
successful footballers, it is evident that the battalion team 
was well supported and that matches generated great interest. 
A.J. Stacey records in his memoir the excitement caused by an 
inter-battalion football match • 
... on these occasions Mick Smythe would mount a 
mule belonging to the transport bedecked with ribbons 
and lead the regiment to the grounds where the match 
was being played. 34 
While the Newfoundlanders were training in Egypt after 
Gallipoli, they played the other battalions in the 88th 
Brigade as well as the Field Ambulance and managed to lose 
each game. 35 They fared better, however, in games of baseball 
against American and Canadian teams. 36 
Competition inspired pride in the battalion and 
supported, and sometimes created, a sense of identity and 
esprit de corps. In late August, 1916, the Newfoundlanders won 
33 r.W.M. 84/46/1 Captain M. Hardie, Chief Censor, Army Postal 
Service: "Report on Morale" February 22, 1918. 
34stacey, "Memoirs of A. J. Stacey: A Newfoundlander At War" 
(Unpublished MSS, C.N.S. Memorial University) p.28. 
35c.N.S. Cell- 179 "Diary of the Late Owen Steele". January 
26, 1916 to February 11, 1916. 
36Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander, p.462. 
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top honours at a Brigade assault-at-arms competition. 37 An 
officer in the Worcestershire Regiment was sufficiently 
impressed to record in his diary: "NFLD came out on top in the 
brigade - of which they may be proud - against three regular 
units. " 38 To win a battlecraft competition in an elite 
division and against regular troops was certainly something 
for which they could be proud. It was undoubtedly a boost to 
the Newfoundlanders' morale. 
Games were also organized within the battalion. Boxing 
was popular with both the men and the officers. At Stab's Camp 
in Scotland, R.S.M. MacKay organized matches in which 
Corporal, later Lieutenant, Stan Goodyear established his 
regimental boxing title. 39 Steele recorded that on occasion, 
boxing matches would be held in the Officer's mess. 40 Sports 
meets became popular with participants and spectators alike. 
In Alexandria, the Worcestershire Regiment's sports day was 
well attended by members of the Newfoundland battalion. 41 A 
37P.R.O. W0/95/2308 "Newfoundland Regiment War Diary" August 
26, 1916. The battalion won 5 first places and 2 seconds. 
38The Liddle Collection (L.C.), The University of Leeds. 
"Strang, William (Lord) Diary" August 30, 1916. 
39Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander, p.152. 
40c.N.S. Call - 179 "Diary of the Late Owen Steele'' February 
26, 1916. 
41c.N.S. Coll-179 "The Diary of the Late owen Steele" 
February 26, 1916. 
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regimental sports day was the featured attraction as the 
Newfoundlanders celebrated their third anniversary away from 
home in October of 1917. 42 
The object of the games was not only to occupy otherwise 
bored soldiers. The greater significance of the sports was the 
way in which they seemed to make life a little more normal. 
Putting a boy in uniform did not fundamentally change him or 
make him somehow different from the rest of society. Fuller, 
in his study of popular culture and troop morale, focuses upon 
the continuities rather than the differences between civilian 
and military life. 43 Soldiers spent their leisure time 
engaged in the same kind of pursuits they enjoyed before they 
volunteered or were conscripted. The Newfoundlanders were no 
different. Woods wrote his parents about the ice-hockey game 
he played in Edinburgh in March 1915. The teams were divided 
according to the players' old hockey clubs back in St.John's. 
He reported; "We had a hockey match there, the Crescents vs. 
the Feildians. Of course we won, the Crescents always do. 1144 
Sport offered a brief respite from the war and gave the 
soldier an opportunity to engage in a familiar activity with 
strong links to civilian life. 
42P.R.O. W0/95/2308 Newfoundland Regiment War Diary. October 
04, 1917. Also: Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander, p.387. 
43Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture pp.114-160. 
44woods Correspondence. Letter to Parents, March 10, 1915. 
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Maintaining the continuities with civilian life had no 
small effect on morale. The Newfoundlanders' experience of 
sport confirms _this. Similarly, concerted efforts were made to 
bring things that were familiar in Newfoundland to the troops 
in France. It would be instructive to examine a number of 
these undertakings which maintained the soldiers' ties with 
his home but which did not originate with the either the 
battalion or the organizations charged with troop welfare such 
as the War Contingent Association or the W.P.A. It would be 
appropriate then to look at the influence on morale of the 
four "necessities" of mail, food, cigarettes and music. 
The Army made mail delivery a top priority and every 
effort was made to maintain frequent and regular deliveries, 
even to the men in the front lines. 45 The mail would go up 
to the men in the trenches together with their rations. Stacey 
recalled that the Commanding Officer put him in charge of the 
battalion's mail and then lectured him on the importance of 
the position. 46 MacLeod recorded in his diary: "Letters from 
V.E. and Auntie. Very glad to hear from them. 1147 Woods wrote 
his mother and said that her letters "cheered me up 
45winter Death's Men p.164. 
46 t . A.J.S acey Memo1r, p.59. 
47N.A.Macleod Diary. January 4, 1916. 
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wonderfully. " 48 Newfoundland papers were another close link 
with the world they had left behind. Gallishaw noted that in 
Gallipoli, "newspapers are argued over as they are very 
popular all hands wanted to read news from home. 1149 Any 
contact with home was welcomed. In the Newspapers "even the 
advertising columns came in for a great deal of attention and 
comment. nSO This link with home helped soothe the personal 
loneliness of the soldier but it also fed the sense of 
community, identity and belonging. 
The object of many morale boosting efforts was to 
replicate a little bit of Newfoundland at the front. This was 
the rationale behind the independently organised "Fish and 
Brew is Fund". In the words of a fundraiser, it was designed to 
provide "the national dish ... for which all Newfoundlanders 
yearn when away from home. 1151 By January 1917, $2201 had . been 
raised and with it, 100 bags of bread and 100 quintals of Fish 
were sent to the battalions in 
48woods Correspondence. Woods to Parents December 22, 1915. 
49Gallishaw. Trenching at Gallipoli p.121. 
5011 The Third Fag" The Veteran Vol.2. No.1. April 1922. p.lO. 
51Journal of the House of Assembly 1917 (Appendix: Reports of 
the N.P.A.) p.344. The dish consists of dried cod and "hard tack" 
biscuit soaked together and boiled usually accompanied by 
"scrunchions" (pork fat) . 
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France and Scotland. 52 Cpl. Walter Tobin noted in his diary 
that he had a "feed of fish and bruise", a wash and a good 
rest before going into the firing line the next day. 53 The 
fish was more than a welcome break from the usual army food. 
When presented at the same time as the bathing parade and much 
needed rest, it was evidently used as a morale booster before 
the men went into the line. 
Along the same lines was the "Mayo-Lind Fund". This fund, 
which raised over $8000 by the end of the war, was dedicated 
to providing the troops with their favourite, familiar brand 
of Newfoundland tobacco. 54 The name of the appeal came from 
the name of the tobacco, "Mayo", and a Private of the Regiment 
who wrote letters to a local paper telling of their progress 
overseas. In one letter, Pte. Frank Lind innocently commented; 
"it is impossible to get good tobacco in this country, a stick 
of Mayo is indeed a luxury. nSS Seeing that their 
representatives overseas were in need, a collection was 
spontaneously organised and the tobacco was dispatched post-
haste. Later Lind thanked the donors of the "Mayo" and wrote, 
52P.A.N.L. MG 632/2.a. Reports of the N.P.A., Meeting of 
January 17, 1917. Also: Nicholson, Fighting Newfoundlander p.402. 
53Tobin Diary. February 27, 1917. (Collection of W.D. Parsons) 
54Lind, The Letters of Mavo-Lind p.174. and Nicholson, The 
Fighting Newfoundlander p.402. 
55Lind, The Letters of Mayo Lind p.38. and The Daily News June 
6, 1915. 
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"God bless the dear friends at home . . . you may be sure we 
will never forget them. 1156 Although it may seem 
insignificant, the fact that familiar cigarettes were 
available at the front was important. Along with the mail, the 
newspapers, the hand knit socks, and the other attentions from 
home, the tobacco contributed to the men's personal comfort 
overseas and provided yet another strand in the many links 
with home. 
Music is an obvious example of an easily transported 
cultural artefact. The songs of James Murphy, the contemporary 
St.John's song writer, were popular as were the British music 
hall tunes. 57 Many songs came from the men of the regiment, 
often as parodies or with words specific to the battalion. A 
rather irreverent, fifteen verse version of the Regiment's 
adventures at Gallipoli was written by two officers. Sargent 
MacLeod copied it into his diary. It concludes on the 
optimistic note: "We'll go back to Terra Nova, to the girl we 
left behind. At Placentia or at Glenwood, What her name is 
never mind. " 58 Another song made fun of their draconian 
Commanding Officer, Col.A.L.Hadow. 
I'm Hadow, some lad-e, 
I've just come off the staff 
56Lind, The Letters of Mayo Lind p.54. 
57Lind, The Letters of Mayo Lind p.139. 
58Macleod Diary. 
I'm with the Newfoundlanders, 
and they know it, not half. 
I'll work them, I'll drill them, 
I'll make the buggers sweat 
For I'm Hadow, some lad-o, 
I'll be a ·general yet. 59 
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Traditional Newfoundland music was in great demand whether at 
concerts or in the trenches . These were especially 
sentimental. An officer described an impromptu performance in 
a dug-out in Flanders in 1917. 
The Banks of Newfoundland rang in our ears 
and we saw once more the tented slopes at Quidi 
Vidi on Regatta Day ... then the player changed 
to a northern song and we saw the rugged coast 
of our island home. 60 
As long as the regiment was overseas there were enough 
reminders of Newfoundland to transport them, for however brief 
a moment, to a place far from the battle, back to their pre-
war, civilian home. 
The comforts, mail, songs and cigarettes that were sent 
to the troops from Newfoundland promoted morale in three ways. 
First they addressed the comfort or physical condition of the 
soldier. It was usually something that was instantly 
gratifying like a new pair of socks, tobacco, or a newspaper 
59Liddle Collection, University of Leeds: 28/7/93. G.Hicks 
Reminiscences. Also: Mr.W.Tobin: Videotaped interview by 
W.D.Parsons 30/7/88. Both songs were attributed to the Medical 
Officer, Dr.Frew. 
6011Meal in a Dug Out" The Veteran Vol.2. No.4. December 1922, 
pp.8-19. 
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from home. Secondly, it was a tangible reminder of the man's 
home and a connection to civilian life. This association with 
home produced the third, albeit subtle factor of identity. The 
regiment's identity was inextricably linked with national 
identity and, as has been demonstrated, this was not without 
beneficial influence on morale. Since, in the Newfoundlanders' 
case, home and the surrogate home of the battalion were 
largely analogous, each invocation of "home" reinforced the 
man's identity with, and sense of belonging to his unit. This 
paid dividends for both morale and unit cohesion. 
The military's initiatives for morale such as sports and 
entertainment were also designed to ameliorate the soldier's 
condition, if only for the duration of the activity. Football 
games and concerts were connections with what the soldier 
identified as being "normal". They represented continuity with 
his civilian life. 
The 1922 Report on Shell Shock recommended that for the 
promotion and maintenance of morale, "good food, good housing, 
recreational relaxation and attention to the comfort and well 
being of the soldier are of the greatest service." 61 
According to the Report on Shell Shock and the evidence 
presented, the efforts to create morale from both the civilian 
and military agencies were successful. The men were far from 
61Report on Shell Shock (1922) p.208. 
Newfoundland and in a hostile environment. 
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The close 
connection with home was vitally important for the creation 
and support of high morale in the Newfoundland Regiment. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of the regimental 
tradition and its local identity 
cannot be over estimated. 1 
This was especially true of the Newfoundland Regiment . 
The twin keys to morale in this regiment were the traditional 
structure of the regimental system and the extraordinary moral 
and material support of the people at home. The British army 
provided the administration and social organization of the 
traditional regimental system. The regiment created a cohesive 
group which facilitated the promotion of morale. The people of 
Newfoundland, by their attention to the comfort and welfare of 
the troops, contributed efforts which would promote morale 
within the framework of the regiment. · 
The Newfoundlanders survived the experience of war better 
than other battalions of the British infantry for two 
corresponding reasons. It was because they maintained the 
traditional regimental structure when other british battalions 
could not, and because of the strong support from the 
community. 
It is possible to identify a number of preconditions for 
the creation and maintenance of morale. The overwhelming 
conclusion is that morale is best served through the 
1 I.Beckett, Nation in Arms, 1914-18" p.24. 
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institution of the battalion within the context of the 
traditional British regiment. Unit cohesion is a necessary 
precondition for high group morale. The British infantry 
battalion acted as a closely knit community which is a most 
effective vehicle for promoting the solidarity characteristic 
of a cohesive unit. The state of morale depends largely upon 
the composition of the group and the degree to which the 
members of the group work together. The battalion was the 
matrix for the creation of morale. It provided the machinery 
for morale, but the fuel to run the machinery had to be added 
from elsewhere. 
Morale was defined as a mood or disposition which 
reflects an attitude toward a situation. This attitude can 
often be described as confidence. Significantly, the 1922 
Report on Shell Shock concluded that "morale can be, and has 
to be created. 112 Cohesion can be created as well. The common 
social background of members contributed homogeneity to the 
group and a critical mass of shared experiences would develop 
if there was enough continuity within the group. Together, 
they engender a sense of corporate identity which results in 
confidence in the group by its members. It was concluded that 
cohesion was a necessary precondition to morale. 
It has been shown that the Newfoundland Regiment was 
2Report on Shell Shock (1922) p.208. 
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organised and administered no differently than the other 
regiments of the British army. This "Cardwellian" regiment had 
three defining characteristics: the common place of origin for 
recruits, identification and connection with that locality and 
an appeal to regimental tradition. The "Cardwellian" regiment 
then, was an ideal vehicle for the promotion of cohesion and 
without cohesion there could be no morale. 
The great change occurred after the vast number of 
casualties in 1916 when the Army was forced to change its 
reinforcement policies. The new policies ended the special 
connection between the soldier and his regiment. This 
effectively killed the "Cardwellian" regiment and terminated 
its role in promoting cohesion and morale. The 
Newfoundlanders, largely because they were considered to be a 
national contingent, were immune from the reinforcement 
reforms and continued to function as a "Cardwell ian" regiment. 
The Newfoundland Regiment survived with the structure of the 
regiment intact. This structure was, at best, a framework and 
morale and cohesion had to be added from external sources. The 
influence of the soldiers' home now becomes important. The 
homogeneity afforded by the men's common place of origin 
contributed to cohesion. Cohesion was strengthened by the 
regiment's national identity. The nation and the regiment were 
analogous and anything that supported the nation, reinforced 
regimental cohesion. 
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Similarly, troop morale was influenced by the remarkably 
close connections with home. The country of Newfoundland took 
great interest in the comfort and welfare of the soldiers. The 
mail, cigarettes and socks sent by the people of Newfoundland 
contributed in no small way to the relatively high morale in 
the regiment. The army's administrative structures could 
produce conditions conducive to good morale and strong 
cohesion but the morale and cohesion themselves had to be 
provided from another source. This source was the people of 
Newfoundland, the society from which the soldiers came. 
The point of this thesis is to demonstrate the influence 
of the regimental system in the promotion of morale and 
cohesion. The case of the Newfoundland Regiment in the First 
World War suggests that the traditional regimental structure 
was an essential precondition to good morale. The 
Newfoundlanders had an advantage that few other infantry 
battalions enjoyed: they were able to maintain strong ties 
with their community and thereby keep their local identity. 
Had the men from Newfoundland been dispersed in different 
regiments throughout the army, there could be no focus of 
morale. It was because they fought together as a unit, as an 
extension of the close knit society from which they came, that 
efforts to promote morale and cohesion within the battalion 
were successful. 
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